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I. Introduction
The U.S. biopharmaceutical industry’s profits in 2017 were
$453 billion.1 Innovative drug development and commercialization
is a major source of the industry’s profits.2 These medical advances
are due in large part to investment in time-consuming and costly
research and development efforts.3 Pharmaceutical companies
then protect their investment in research via intellectual property
rights—namely, patents.4 One such Irish-based biopharmaceutical
company, Allergan, Inc., grossed approximately $6.45 billion in

1. Global Pharmaceutical Sales From 2014 to 2016, STATISTA (2017),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/world-pharmaceutical-sales-byregion/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. See Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat
Profits, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223
(last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing the pharmaceutical industry’s large profit
margins due to expensive drugs and low manufacturing costs) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Richard Frank & Paul B. Ginsburg, Pharmaceutical Industry Profits
and Research and Development, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/11/17/pharmaceutical-industryprofits-and-research-and-development/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“[T]he cost of
bringing a new drug to market is very high and the process is risky.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Robert Weisman, Cost of Bringing Drug to
Market Tops $2.5b, Research Finds, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/18/cost-bringing-prescriptiondrug-market-tops-billion-tufts-research-center-estimates/6mPph8maRxzcvftWjr
7HUN/story.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (estimating that bringing a new
drug to market costs approximately $2.5 billion dollars over the course of a
decade) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Frank & Ginsberg, supra note 3 (“[I]f free competition were
permitted, firms spending hundreds of millions of dollars to bring a new drug to
market would be unlikely to recoup those investments, as competition would drive
prices down to production costs.”).
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2017.5 Allergan’s second-best-selling drug, a prescription eye-drop
medicine called Restasis, earned $1.4 billion in revenue in 2016.6
In theory, pharmaceutical companies’ drug monopolies are
meant to incentivize medical breakthroughs,7 though in practice
the industry is frequently criticized for exploiting monopolies to
make windfall profits at the public’s expense.8 This has come about
in a number of forms. For instance, some firms pay generic drug
companies to delay selling bioequivalent versions of lucrative
medications once their patents expire in exchange for large
settlements, otherwise known by the shorthand phrase “pay for
delay.”9 Another example that has gained popularity in recent
years is “patent hopping.”10 This practice extends a drug’s patent
monopoly and blocks generic competition by slightly reformulating
the medication and filing for a new patent when a drug’s original
patent is close to expiration.11 Engendering consumer distrust and

5. Annual Financials for Allergan PLC, MARKETWATCH (2016),
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/agn/financials?mg=prod/accountmw (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. Ashley E. Petrarca, Allergan’s Battle to Stay in Court: Does Inter Partes
Review Violate the Constitution by Circumventing Courtroom Adjudication?, 2017
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 6 (2017).
7. See Mark S. Levy, Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing
on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 247 (2016)
(“[P]harmacologists are contributing medical advances to confront ravaging
disease. They are developing drugs to mitigate the effects of Alzheimer’s, HIV,
multiple sclerosis, and various forms of cancer.”).
8. See id. at 252 (describing one of the most sensational and highly
criticized maneuvers when Turing Pharmaceutical CEO Martin Shkreli
instituted a 5000% overnight price hike for a medication used to treat a
life-threatening illness found in patients with HIV/AIDS).
9. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 160 (2013) (addressing the issue
of whether a pharmaceutical company’s settlement with generic companies not to
challenge the patent in exchange for millions of dollars violates antitrust laws).
10. See Benjamin Lajoie & Lauren Barnes, Uncertainty Remains for Pharma
Product Hopping Liability, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2017, 12:48 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/959102/uncertainty-remains-for-pharmaproduct-hopping-liability (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (describing the phenomena
of “patent hopping”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. Id.
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political backlash,12 manipulative practices like these drive legal
and policy developments both in antitrust and patent law.13
In contrast to highly profitable pharmaceutical companies,
many Native American nations suffer from crippling poverty and
lack of economic stimulation.14 A federally recognized tribe, the
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (the Tribe) is located in northern New
York, straddling the U.S. and Canadian border.15 The Tribe has an
unemployment rate double that of its neighboring county—itself
one of the poorest in the nation.16 The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s
major source of revenue is the Akwesasne Mohawk Casino Resort,
bringing in about $19 million annually and employing 40% of its

12. See Andrew Pollack, Big Price Increase for Tuberculosis Drug Is
Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/
business/big-price-increase-for-tb-drug-is-rescinded.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2018) (quoting then-Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton that
“[p]rice-gouging . . . in the specialty drug market is outrageous”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638,
642 (2d Cir. 2015) (considering whether defendant drug company’s withdrawal of
an older drug from the market “in order to force Alzheimer's patients who depend
on [the drug] to switch to [the newly patented version] before [the generic drug]
becomes available” is unlawfully anticompetitive); Levy, supra note 7, at 254
(discussing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence aiming to curb anticompetitive
practices within the pharmaceutical industry).
14. See Robert J. Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique
Challenges, Unlimited Potential, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1298 (2008) (“American
Indians remain as a group the poorest of the poor in the United States.”); Dao Lee
Bernardi-Boyle, State Corporations for Indian Reservations, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
41, 41 (2002) (“Reservation American Indians are among the poorest people living
in this country.”).
15. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (describing the
factual background and identity of the parties); Joe Jackson, A Native-American
Nation Divided, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2015/01/native-american-nation-divided-20151710544289875.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2017) (describing the jurisdictional split in the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe between United States and Canada) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
16. Adam Davidson, Why Is Allergan Partnering with the St. Regis Mohawk
Tribe?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2017/11/20/why-is-allergan-partnering-with-the-st-regis-mohawk-tribe
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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staff with members of the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.17 Still, the
Tribe’s infrastructure struggles to support the community.18
These entities, comparatively, are two of the most and least
powerful in American society and seemingly share nothing in
common. That changed on September 8, 2017, when Allergan and
the Tribe announced an agreement to transfer six patents
protecting Restasis to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.19
Lawmakers,20 judges,21 and practitioners22 immediately

17. Jackson, supra note 15; Brief of Appellants at 5, Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
18. See Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native
American Tribe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/08/health/allergan-patent-tribe.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (quoting the
Tribe’s general counsel stating that “[t]he tribe has many unmet [financial]
needs”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Cynthia Koons &
Susan Decker, Casinos Aren’t Enough as Native Tribe Makes Deal on Drug
Patents, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-09-09/casinos-aren-t-enough-as-native-tribe-makes-deal-on-drugpatents (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (quoting the Tribe’s general counsel as noting
that despite casino revenues, the needs of the Mohawk community are unmet) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (introducing the
chronology of the dispute surrounding the Restasis deal).
20. See S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing a bill restricting an Indian
tribe from asserting sovereign immunity as a defense in a review conducted under
the Patent Act); Jan Wolf, U.S. Senator Slams Allergan Patent Deal with
Native-American
Tribe,
REUTERS
(Sept.
20,
2017,
9:38
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-allergan-patents/u-s-senator-slamsallergan-patent-deal-with-native-american-tribe-idUSKCN1BQ2BE (last visited
Sept. 19, 2018) (quoting an Ohio democratic senator that Congress should “close
loopholes that drug companies exploit to avoid competition”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB,
2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (comparing the transaction to
other “sham” transactions, such as abusive tax shelters).
22. See David Crow, Pharma Industry Faces Hypocrisy Charge over Patents,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ad85104e-bd86-11e7b8a3-38a6e068f464 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (citing a spokesperson for Eli
Lilly, a prominent U.S. drug maker, for not supporting the Allergan-Saint Regis
deal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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questioned the legitimacy of the deal. Still, the deal was not
without its supporters23 and followers.24
The transaction received such a swift and polarizing response
because it aimed to shield the Restasis patents from an
administrative proceeding that could otherwise potentially bring
about the patents’ cancelation.25 Briefly summarizing how this is
possible, a patent may be subject to a post-issuance review of
patentability even after the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) grants a patent.26 Such ex post facto invalidation
can occur through a number of procedures, but generally speaking
can be adjudicated either by the Patent Trial and Appeals Board
(PTAB)27 at the request of any party,28 or in federal district court,
or both.29 In fact, parties almost systematically dispute patent
validity in two forums simultaneously—roughly 80% of PTAB
invalidation proceedings involve parallel proceedings in federal
court.30
23. See Petrarca, supra note 6, at 12 (arguing that because IPR
“diminishe[s]” patent protections, Allergan was rightly motivated to invent
methods to circumvent the proceeding altogether).
24. See Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss, Apple Inc. v. MEC Resources,
LLC, No. IPR2018-00286, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2018) (moving to dismiss IPR
proceedings on tribal immunity grounds).
25. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (discussing the
Tribe’s motion to terminate the IPR after acquiring the patents); infra Part II.A
(describing inter partes review—a procedure by which a party can petition an
administrative body to reconsider an invention’s patentability on limited
grounds).
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (dictating the scope of reconsideration
during an inter partes review proceeding: novelty and nonobviousness in light of
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications).
27. Id. § 303 (“[T]he Director will determine whether a substantial new
question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by
the request [for reexamination] . . . .”).
28. Id. § 311(a) (“[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with
the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent . . . .”).
29. Id. § 282(b)(2) (listing invalidity as a defense available against the claim
of infringement); see also Sovereign Immunity and the Intellectual Property
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Internet, 115th Cong. 1 (2017) (testimony of Professor Karl Manheim, Loyola Law
School) [hereinafter Professor Manheim Testimony] (“Once issued, patent
controversies can arise either in federal court or in the PTO.”).
30. Desmond O’Sullivan, PTAB Deals a Crippling Blow to Sovereign
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Allergan sought to preemptively evade the PTAB’s
after-the-fact invalidation by transferring legal rights in the
patents to a sovereign entity, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.31
Tribes, like other sovereign entities such as states or foreign
nations, generally enjoy immunity from suit.32 Allergan and Saint
Regis believed that because a suit against the Tribe (either an
administrative adjudication or civil litigation) as the patent holder
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to tribal
immunity,33 the drug’s intellectual property would remain
somewhat insulated from third party legal attacks.34
But even before the Tribe became the patent holder, Allergan
was involved in ongoing disputes with a number of generic drug
companies regarding the Restasis patents.35 The dispute developed
in two forums: one in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas36 and the other in a specialized PTAB
Immunity, LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2018, 4:37 PM), www.law360.com/articles/998503/
ptab-deals-a-crippling-blow-to-sovereign-immunity (last visited Sept. 19, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See Press Release, Allergan, Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
Announce Agreements Regarding RESTASIS® Patents (Sept. 8, 2017),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/allergan-and-saint-regis-mohawktribe-announce-agreements-regarding-restasis-patents-300516422.html
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Allergan Press Release] (“The Tribe, a
recognized sovereign tribal government, is filing a motion to dismiss the ongoing
inter partes review (IPR) of the RESTASIS® patents based on their sovereign
immunity from IPR challenges.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
32. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998) (comparing
tribal, state, and foreign sovereign immunity).
33. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., No. IPR2016-01274,
2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (“[C]onsidering the nature of
inter partes review and civil litigation, we conclude that the considerable
resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to
the States by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
34. See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB,
2017 WL 4619790, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (describing the patent
holders’ intention to avoid the PTAB proceeding, but noting that in the district
court litigation the patent holder could not move to dismiss because it initiated
the suit, thereby waiving any immunity privilege).
35. See Allergan, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1–2
(describing the history of the litigation between Allergan, the generic drug
companies, and later the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe).
36. Allergan, Inc.’s Complaint for Patent Infringement, Allergan, Inc. v.
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proceeding.37 Allergan initiated the litigation, suing a number of
generic companies in the Eastern District of Texas for infringing
the Restasis patents by filing for the right to manufacture a generic
bioequivalent version of drug.38 In response, the defendant generic
drug companies asserted the affirmative defense of invalidity—the
companies admitted to infringing Allergan’s patents, but claimed
that the patents were invalid.39 In the midst of the litigation,
Allergan moved to join the Tribe as party to the lawsuit after it
became the purported patent owner.40
As in most infringement suits,41 the generic pharmaceutical
companies subsequently initiated the proceeding at the PTAB.42
Those seeking to invalidate patents tend to prefer the PTAB
proceedings over district court litigation for a number of reasons.43
The petitioners filed a petition for inter partes review, a specialized
patent review proceeding conducted by the PTAB. Inter partes
review, or IPR, is a newly created and highly popular type of
proceeding that allows any party to challenge a patent’s validity.44
IPRs have garnered disagreements since their creation in 2011 by
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act.45
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
37. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01132, at *24
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2016) (instituting inter partes review for Allergan’s patents).
38. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., Inc., No. 2:15-CV-01455-WCB, 2017 WL
4803941, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2015).
39. See Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Allergan, Inc. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *21 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 21, 2015) (answering that the Restasis patents are invalid).
40. See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4619790, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (describing the procedural background
after Allergan notified the court of the patent transfer to Saint Regis).
41. See O’Sullivan, supra note 30 (discussing the frequency that patents are
disputed in parallel district court litigation and PTAB proceedings).
42. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., Case IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL
1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
43. See infra Part II.B (discussing a number of procedural and substantive
advantages for the patent challenger in PTAB proceedings).
44. See Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 719, 740–41 (2016) (describing inter partes review, a newly crafted
reexamination proceeding conducted by a panel of administrative patent judges).
45. See Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018) (challenging the constitutionality of IPR on the grounds
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Allergan’s CEO is among those that disapprove of the new
reexamination process.46 As such, Allergan, with a history of
engaging in controversial business decisions, took affirmative
steps to protect its intellectual property rights.47 Apparently
inspired by a recent PTAB decision allowing a state university to
invoke immunity in IPR,48 Allergan agreed to transfer rights in the
Restasis patents to the Tribe for $13.75 million dollars.49 In return,
the Tribe agreed to invoke its sovereign immunity in IPR
proceedings.50
In the light of the Allergan–Saint Regis deal, this Note argues
that the legal framework for sovereign immunity should be the
same with respect to state and tribal patent holders. Additionally,
this Note argues that because it is unlikely Congress possesses the
constitutional authority to abrogate state immunity, that the
that it violates Article III and the Seventh Amendment).
46. See Brent Saunders, Reverse Patent Trolls Are Harming Drug
Innovation—and Patients, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2017, 2:33 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/reverse-patent-trolls-are-harming-drug-innovation
and-patients-1507487600 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (arguing that IPRs
“disadvantage . . . biopharma innovators and the patients they serve”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. See Dennis Crouch, Allergan: Creating Sovereign Immunity with Tribal
Pass-Through, PATENTLYO (Sept. 8, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/09/
allergan-creating-sovereign.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Allergan is a
frequent player of jurisdictional games. Its corporate ‘headquarters’ is in Dublin
for the tax benefits, although it is ‘actually’ sited in New Jersey.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Chelsea Naso, Pfizer, Allergan End $160B
Merger After New Inversion Regs, LAW360 (April 6, 2016, 7:01 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/781067/pfizer-allergan-end-160b-merger-afternew-inversion-regs (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (reporting that Pfizer and
Allergan’s anticipated merger that would save Pfizer $35 billion in U.S. taxes was
thwarted by the IRS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274,
2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (dismissing IPR on state
immunity grounds when a third party petitioned for IPR review of a state
university patent).
49. See Exhibit 2087 Patent License Agreement at 9, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v.
Allergan, Inc., Case IPR2016-01132 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2017) [hereinafter License
Agreement] (stipulating the “upfront payment” between Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe and Allergan).
50. See SHORT FORM PATENT ASSIGNMENT 1–2 (2017), http://legacyassignments.uspto.gov/assignments/assignment-pat-43532-422.pdf
(memorializing the patent assignment agreement between Allergan and the Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe).
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legislature should unequivocally extend state and tribal sovereign
immunity in IPRs. To argue this, this Note explores the policy
concerns and justifications of tribal and state immunity within
administrative patent review.
In addressing these concerns and justifications, Part II.A
discusses patent law’s central policy aims. At its core, patent law
aims to achieve the constitutional demand to balance incentivizing
invention against over-monopolizing patent rights for the benefit
of society.51 Part II.B then describes the administrative scheme
that governs patent rights. In particular, this legal background
will focus on the recent development of inter partes review as
instituted by the America Invents Act.52
Part III first discusses the history of tribal sovereign
immunity and its contemporary understanding. Specifically, this
historical analysis focuses on the congressional policy objective of
tribal self-determination.53 Second, Part III considers state
sovereignty, notably, the recent judicial reinforcement of state
sovereign immunity during the Rehnquist Court’s “New
Federalism” Era.54 This discussion illuminates the differences
between the two sovereigns as stemming from their disparate legal
bases: tribal sovereignty was judicially created but long
understood as subject to congressional regulation55 whereas state
sovereignty is tethered to the Eleventh Amendment and largely
insulated from congressional control.56
Part IV then analyzes the long-term implications of the
Allergan–Saint Regis deal against this legal backdrop. Chiefly, the
analysis focuses on a critique of the PTAB and Federal Circuit’s
51. See infra Part II.A (discussing the constitutional and philosophical
justifications for the American patent regime).
52. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of
28 and 35 U.S.C.).
53. See infra Part III.B (discussing the interplay between tribal economic
opportunities and immunity).
54. See In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, infra note 249 and
accompanying text (discussing a series of Supreme Court decisions during the
Rehnquist Court that bolstered state sovereign immunity).
55. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014)
(“[T]ribes are subject to plenary control by Congress.”).
56. See discussion infra Part III.C (noting the decisions where the Court
struck Congress’s attempts to abrogate state immunity).
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recent decisions in response to the Allergan–Saint Regis deal.57
The main shortcoming of the PTAB’s reasoning is an unexplained
departure from the existing, albeit developing, legal framework for
sovereign immunity in administrative patent proceedings.58 The
argument follows that the PTAB’s inconsistent treatment of tribes
and states is not premised on discernible legal or policy reasons.
The Federal Circuit, although identifying the proper legal
standard, misapplies it. This has led to states and tribes possessing
different rights within administrative patent reexamination.
Finding that sovereign patent owners are interchangeable under
the proper legal framework, this Note argues that their legal rights
within the patent administrative reexamination process should
likewise be identical.
Furthermore, the only governing body with the authority and
policymaking capability to address this inconsistency is
Congress.59 Moreover, if Congress precludes this maneuver
through legislation, it should not treat states and tribes
differently. Two justifications support this conclusion, one
pragmatic and one ethical. First, abrogating only tribal immunity
in PTAB reexamination hearings does not effectively close the
loophole because state universities will continue to successfully
assert immunity.60 Second, robbing only one sovereign of its
immunity privilege derogates Congress’s goal to incentivize tribal
self-determination
and
economic
development—a
grave
impairment to tribes’ dignitary and financial interests.61
57. See infra Part IV.B–C (arguing that the PTAB and Federal Circuits
reasoning is unsound).
58. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc., No.
IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (Jan. 25, 2017) (holding that state
immunity applies to IPR because of the similarity between IPR and civil
litigation).
59. See Brief of Amici Scholars in Support of Patent Owner the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe at 1, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016 01127,
2016 WL 10655556 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Scholars’ Brief]
(“Congress, not the Board (nor Article III courts), is the arbiter of tribal immunity
and the proper forum for considering the policy arguments and objections raised
by Petitioners.”).
60. See Professor Manheim Testimony, supra note 29 (“Whatever the
outcome in Allergan, the issue is likely to recur.”).
61. See Bernardi-Boyle, supra note 14, at 41 (“[G]reater access to private
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This leads to Congress’s second potential response: abrogating
neither tribal nor state immunity in IPR. Allowing a sovereign
entity to benefit from the patent system and simultaneously evade
unfavorable outcomes certainly seems unfair and undermines the
patent system because it forecloses the PTO from certain
procedures;62 however, every invocation of sovereign immunity at
the expense of the complaining party is inherently unfair.63 But
more importantly, any attempt to judicially curtail both
sovereigns’ immunity would likely not withstand the Supreme
Court’s scrutiny. That is to say that if the Federal Circuit finds
that both tribal and state immunity is inapplicable in IPR,64 it is
likely that the Supreme Court would reverse only the restriction of
state immunity.65
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s decision fails to consider
the implications on federal Indian law more broadly. An
unthinking condemnation of the Saint Regis deal conflates the
pharmaceutical industry’s pattern of dubiousness with tribal
economic diversification. Abrogation of sovereign immunity in
patent proceedings uniquely damages tribes because of the
difficulties that tribes face generating revenue. Congress should
capital is an essential ingredient for improving conditions on reservations.”).
62. See Professor Manheim Testimony, supra note 29 (advocating for
legislation that abrogates state and tribal immunity in IPR).
63. See SHORTELL, infra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that many
scholars denounce the doctrine of sovereign immunity because of its impact on
plaintiffs).
64. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding “that tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in
IPRs); Brief of the States of Indiana, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of En Banc Rehearing at 1–2,
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. July
20, 2018) (No. 18-1638) [hereinafter State Amicus Brief Support En Banc
Rehearing] (supporting the Tribe for its application for a rehearing en banc due
to the likelihood that the Federal Circuit’s decision will also affect state immunity
in IPR). It should be noted that the litigation could unfold in a number of ways.
For instance, the Federal Circuit may reverse the PTAB’s holding during an en
banc rehearing. Alternatively, the Supreme Court may not grant certiorari for
either case. But in a number of different scenarios, the chance of differing legal
precedents concerning tribes and states is possible, if not likely.
65. See infra Part III.A–C (explaining the difference between tribal and state
sovereign immunity and Congress’s ability to affect each).
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therefore allow continued invocation of sovereign immunity within
patent review in the name of continued tribal economic
development.
II. Introduction to Patent Law
Normatively speaking, opposition to the Tribe’s motion to
dismiss the IPR proceeding stems from the concern that sovereigns
should not be able to evade the U.S. patent scheme that carefully
determines which inventions should benefit from protection.66 To
understand this concern, it is essential to begin by examining the
philosophical justifications for granting protection to patent
owners. Although it is perhaps impossible to discern a singular
justification for protecting intellectual property,67 utilitarianism is
the primary rationalization.68
A. Philosophical Justifications
Thomas Jefferson believed that “an inventor ought to be
allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain
time . . . . [I]ngenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”69
Jefferson’s beliefs likely stemmed from intellectual property
66. See Professor Manheim Testimony, supra note 29 (“State and tribal
sovereign immunity in patent cases distorts the patent system and can lead to
anticompetitive conduct harming consumers and the public welfare.”).
67. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957, 957 (1982) (maintaining Hegel’s theory of personhood related to
property which argues that “to achieve proper self-development—to be a
person— an individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“Patent law [has] long been
defended by reference to Locke’s theory that labor creates an entitlement to its
fruits.”).
68. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 542 (2005) (“[M]ost scholars today base their
understandings of property on a model where property is justified by
utilitarianism and defined by positive law rather than upon natural rights
theories.”).
69. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
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protections existing in English jurisprudence.70 Later, Jefferson’s
view on intellectual property, particularly the incentive theory,
was codified in the Constitution. The Patent and Copyright Clause
of Article I gives Congress the authority “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]”71 Unlike other rights, there is no natural right to
Rather,
patent
rights
are
intellectual
property.72
government-created rights. In creating the patent system, the
government generally seeks to advance two competing goals
which, when balanced, promote scientific advancement for the
benefit of society.73 These two competing goals are: promoting
invention and limiting diffusion costs.74 The following discussion is
a simplistic, but nevertheless helpful, description of the economic
justification for patent protections.
Patents, like other types of intellectual property, are ideas or
inventions that have been “propertized.”75 Thus, patents are
subject to protection only under a formal legal regime.76 In other
words, patents are “limited private monopol[ies].”77 Because ideas
and inventions are different from other commodities, they require
formalized protection to generate value for the inventor.78 The key
70. See Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1377 (2018) (“The Patent Clause in our Constitution ‘was written
against the backdrop’ of the English system.”); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 67,
at 1 (noting early law protection of intellectual property such as the English
Statute of Monopolies of 1624 and the Statute of Anne).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 68, at 542 (2005) (noting the
gradual decline in the natural rights theory of property, especially in light of the
realist movement).
73. See id. at 563 (balancing “incentives for innovation against the costs
produced by monopoly-induced deadweight loss” and ultimately concluding that
determining this precise trade-off is “elusive” in the real world).
74. See PETER S. MENELL, MARK LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES,
I INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017 16–20
(describing the economic justifications for intellectual property).
75. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 67, at 1 (noting the historical
development of intellectual property legal protection in the United States).
76. Id.
77. Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
78. See MENELL, ET AL., supra note 74, at 17–18 (describing public goods’
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difference between inventions and other commodities is that
inventions are public goods whereas other commodities are private
goods—the former can be disbursed endlessly without cost
whereas the latter is a finite quantity, which the owner only grants
access to by selling it.79
Therefore, an unscrupulous copyist can steal an idea from its
original creator, circumventing any development costs, and selling
the embodiment of the idea into the market at a lower cost.80 This,
then, discourages the original inventor from investing time and
money into an invention that can easily be stolen. Without some
form of legal protection, scientific and artistic progress is impeded.
To accomplish this, the U.S. patent regime confers on its owner
“the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling the invention throughout the United States.”81
However, unfettered monopolies would drive prices of public
goods above their marginal costs and thereby reduce access at the
detriment to society.82 The government, therefore, limits patent
monopolies by way of its duration and scope.83 The scope of
protection, for instance, does not extend to “small details, obvious
improvements, or frivolous devices.”84 Rather, only those
inventions that contribute a truly novel, nonobvious contribution
inherent depletion sans formal protections and noting another examples of a
public good as national defense); Davidson, supra note 16 (“When it comes to
physical goods and land, property rights are usually fairly intuitive. But
intellectual property is inherently more arbitrary.”).
79. MENELL, ET AL., supra note 74, at 17–18.
80. See Frank & Ginsburg, supra note 3 (discussing the effect of patent
monopolies within the context of the pharmaceutical industry).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
82. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945) (“The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a
patent . . . give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.”); LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 67, at 1 (“[E]nabling the creator of intellectual property to charge a price for
copies . . . in excess of his marginal cost, prevents access to (use of) the intellectual
property by persons who value that access at more than the marginal cost but less
than the price.”).
83. See MENELL, ET AL., supra note 74, at 19 (“One of the reasons that
intellectual property rights are limited to scope, duration, and effect is to balance
these costs and benefits.”).
84. Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
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are protected.85 Similarly, a patent monopoly is further controlled
by limiting its duration.86 Because innovation necessarily requires
a rich public domain, it is in society’s best interest to limit the
length of time inventions are protected to encourage others to
improve upon the invention without infringing.87
B. The Contemporary Patent System
Balancing these two objectives, however, is a tricky feat.88 The
difficulty of balancing incentives against over-monopolization is
evident in Congress’s numerous attempts to amend the USPTO’s
administrative proceedings throughout the twentieth century.89
Congress thus passed the 1952 Patent Act to address the concern
that the USPTO granted too many weak patents.90 The drafters
had the ambitious goal of overhauling the patent system and
“recogniz[ed that] patents are distinct from obnoxious monopolies
and are a reward or an inducement to bring forth new
knowledge.”91 The 1952 Act made significant improvements, such
as delineating distinct grounds for patentability that were
previously lacking.92 Nevertheless, the complaint about low quality
85. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012) (codifying criteria for an invention to be
patentable).
86. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 3–7 (1969) (arguing that the
best way to balance the social costs versus the benefits of monopolies is by their
term lengths).
87. See id. at 20 (“Knowledge in society is cumulative.”).
88. See id. at 22 (“[S]ociety must determine the appropriate requirements
for, duration and scope of, and set of rights afforded intellectual property.”); Bell
& Parchomovsky, supra note 68, at 563 (“[D]etermining where this balance lies
in the real world has proved to be elusive.”).
89. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 44, at 735 (“Congress made several
attempts to create procedures that would address the ‘lax’ standards of the Patent
Office that supposedly resulted in ‘low quality’ patents.”).
90. See Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III, The Rosetta Stone
for the Doctrines of Means-Plus-Function Patent Claims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 227, 272 (1997) (“The Patent Act of 1952 was enacted in part as a
response to the harsh attitude toward patents in the thirties and forties.”).
91. Id. at 273.
92. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 44, at 734 (describing the 1952 Patent
Act’s substantive provisions).
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patents persisted despite the 1952 Act’s substantial contribution
to substantive patent law.93
Amidst these complaints, the first post-grant administrative
proceedings were created.94 Although litigants could always bring
an invalidation proceeding in district court, administrative
reexamination was meant to correct the USPTO’s errors more
efficiently and cheaply.95 The first post-grant examination
mechanism was created in 1980 by the Bayh-Dole Act.96 However,
the experiment was quickly met with criticism, particularly
because it operated largely like the initial patent prosecution.97
This meant that the party that requested reexamination was never
party to the proceeding, and hence could not argue for
invalidation.98 Addressing the concern, Congress again set out to
cure the plague of low quality patents through post-issuance
examination, this time involving third parties in the proceeding.99
This too was largely unsuccessful.100
The latest change came by way of the Leahy–Smith America
Invents Act (AIA) passed in 2011.101 The AIA amended and
expanded the previous post-grant review proceedings in several

93. See id. (“The drumbeat of complaints about ‘poor quality’ patents that
make it through the porous sieve of the PTO continued even after Congress
enacted the far-reaching reforms in the 1952 Patent Act.”).
94. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322,
1330–34 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J., concurring) (explaining the history of
reexamination procedures that preceded IPR).
95. See Sherry M. Knowles et al., Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the
United States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 611 (2004) (“The
reexamination process was intended to . . . ‘settle validity disputes more quickly
and less expensively than litigation.’”).
96. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
97. Dolin & Manta, supra note 44, at 736–37.
98. Id.
99. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501 (codified in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006)) (repealed
2012) (creating inter partes reexamination).
100. See Knowles et al., infra note 95, at 614 (“A common complaint [of the
AIPLA] was that the inter partes procedure left a patent challenger with less
options, not more input.”).
101. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in scattered Sections of 28
U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
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significant ways.102 Relevant here, the Act replaced the former
inter partes reexamination proceedings with inter partes review.103
Congress passed the AIA with the purpose of “establish[ing] a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation
costs.”104 To achieve these ends, the AIA and the USPTO
structured IPRs with a number of procedural and substantive
changes to the prior reexamination procedure.
First, IPRs were meant to give “broader participation rights”
to third parties.105 As such, IPRs allow any third party to assert
that the PTO should never have issued the patent in the first
instance—that is, to challenge the patent’s validity.106 IPRs also
allow joinder to an existing proceeding.107 Second, a patent holder’s
ability to amend her claim in an IPR, unlike in the former inter

102. See EDWARD D. MANZO, AMERICA INVENTS ACT–A GUIDE TO PATENT
LITIGATION AND PATENT PROCEDURE § 15:1 (2016) (listing the PTAB’s four
post-grant review proceedings: “(1) review adverse decisions of examiners upon
applications for patents pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a); (2) review appeals of
reexaminations pursuant to § 134(b); (3) conduct derivation proceedings pursuant
to § 135; and (4) conduct inter partes reviews and post-grant reviews pursuant to
Chapters 31 and 32”); Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498–99 (2012) (“The USPTO’s toolbox of new or fortified
proceedings . . . includes post-grant review, inter partes review, supplemental
examination, and derivation proceedings, as well as a transitional post-grant
review program for certain business methods patents.”).
103. See MANZO, supra note 102, § 16:1 (describing the AIA’s procedural
changes to post-grant review proceedings).
104. Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
105. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016).
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may
request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground
that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art
consisting of patents or printed publications.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship,
564 U.S. 91, 96 (2011) (“[A]n alleged infringer may assert the invalidity of the
patent—that is, he may attempt to prove that the patent never should have issued
in the first place.”).
107. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic
Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 45, 58 (2016) (finding that permitting joinder and a lack of standing
creates “opportunities for robust public participation”).
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partes reexamination, is far more limited if not impossible.108
Third, IPRs are adversarial proceedings that more closely
resemble traditional litigation than its administrative
predecessor.109
Still, there are significant substantive differences that
distinguish IPR from traditional litigation.110 For instance, the AIA
mandates a lower burden of proof than the district court’s “clear
and convincing evidence” to a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard.111 Additionally, the standard for claim construction in
IPR is the “broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification” standard.112 By contrast, a claim is assessed by its
“ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill in the art”
in federal court.113 Because a claim is given its “broadest
reasonable construction,” in IPR it is more likely that the patent
will overlap with prior art,114 rendering the patent invalid.
The idea behind these changes was to create an adversarial
proceeding that allows third party challengers an efficient and
cost-effective means of challenging questionable patents.115 In
108. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 44, at 786 (“Th[e] radical shift from an
examinational to an adjudicatory model, which deprives the patentee of the actual
ability to continue its pas de deux with the PTO, is what separates inter partes
reexamination from IPR.”).
109. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (stating the Director is to promulgate regulations
for inter partes review proceedings that enact many features common to judicial
proceedings, including discovery, depositions, protective orders, the imposition of
sanctions, and an oral hearing); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at *46, 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N.
67, 77 (“The Act converts inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an
adjudicative proceeding.”).
110. See Cuozzo Speed, 136 S. Ct. at 2143 (“[I]nter partes review is less like a
judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency proceeding.”); Tran, supra
note 102, at 496 (“The [AIA] requires the USPTO, rather than the courts, to make
core judgments that affect patent policy and substantive patent rights.”).
111. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012) (“[T]he petitioner shall have the burden of
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
112. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016).
113. Cuozzo Speed, 136 S. Ct. at 2142.
114. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (defining “prior art” as an “invention [that]
was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public” before an inventor applies for a patent).
115. See Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 107, at 45 (“A major normative
argument for administrative ex post review is that it should be an efficient,
accessible, and accurate substitute for Article III litigation over patent validity.”).
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particular, Congress sought to address so-called “patent trolls.”116
Patent trolls are non-practicing entities that acquire patent rights
without operationalizing them and make a business out of suing
infringers.117 Non-practicing entities therefore undermine the
patent regime’s central goal: to encourage technological advances
for the benefit of society.118 Furthermore, addressing
non-practicing entities was part of the overall goal to decrease the
number of weak or low quality patents.119 Indeed, IPRs have
proven a popular and effective alternative to litigation for parties
seeking to invalidate issued patents ex post facto.120
In fact, some groups argue that the pendulum swung too far
in the other direction—unduly disfavoring legitimate patent
holders and therefore hindering innovation.121 One former Federal
Circuit Chief Judge famously dubbed IPRs as the “death squad”
for patent holders because of the reasons noted above.122 Those who
116. See ABBOTT ET AL., CRIPPLING THE INNOVATION ECONOMY: REGULATORY
OVERREACH AT THE PATENT OFFICE, REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT 11
(2017) (Reg. Transparency Project Working Paper Grp.), https://regproject.org/
wp-content/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-Group-Paper.pdf (listing
non-practicing entity concerns as one of Congress’s three main objectives when
passing the AIA).
117. See id. at 10–11 (using the example of MPHJ Technologies, an entity
sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission for deceptively threatening patent
infringement suits).
118. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of
Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 427 (2014)
(noting that some scholars find that “NPEs hinder rather than encourage
innovation”).
119. See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881
(2015) (“Congress attempted to ‘reform’ the patent system in the name of reducing
the prevalence of dubious patents.”).
120. See Susan Decker, Apple Likes Patent ‘Death Squad.’ Allergan Pays to
Avoid
It,
BLOOMBERG
TECH.
(Sept.
20,
2017,
4:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-20/apple-likes-the-patentdeath-squad-allergan-pays-to-avoid-it (last updated Sept. 20, 2017) (last visited
Sept. 19, 2018) (citing statistics from Unified Patents that challengers prefer the
PTAB over federal district court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
121. See Dolin, supra note 119, at 882 (arguing that the AIA “failed to fully
take into account all of the costs of ‘weeding out’ the improperly granted patents
and the fact that such costs fall disproportionally on the legitimate patentees”).
122. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially
Viable Patents Valid, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
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oppose IPRs argue that a troubling circuitous relationship exists
when the same administrative body both grants intellectual
property rights and then extinguishes them.123 As Justice Gorsuch
recently put it,
After much hard work and no little investment you devise
something you think truly novel. . . . The patent affords you
exclusive rights to the fruits of your labor for two decades. But
what happens if someone later emerges from the woodwork,
arguing that it was all a mistake and your patent should be
canceled?124

IPR critics went so far as to challenge the constitutionality of
the proceeding in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Group, LLC.125 The petitioners raised two constitutional
issues: whether a non-Article III court can terminate patent rights
without a jury—or, whether IPR violates (1) Article III and (2) the
Seventh Amendment.126 Although the case had the potential to
drastically disrupt administrative patent reexamination, the
Court found that neither of these constitutional issues foreclose the
PTAB from reconsidering patents in IPR.127 Oil States, together
2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48
642/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
123. See Charles Kennedy, Standing on Edge: The Lack of Standing
Requirements in the U.S.P.T.O. Inter Partes Review Raises a Constitutional Issue,
45 RUTGERS L. REC. 13, 14 (2018) (“Inter partes review is unconstitutional because
it is an improper delegation of judicial power, in that it confers the ability to
decide on an issue already adjudicated by an administrative agency and removes
this authority from the constitutional protection provided by an Article III court
proceeding.”); Brian Mahoney, Software Patent Ruling A Major Judicial Failure,
Rader Says, Law360 (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
482264/software-patent-ruling-a-major-judicial-failure-rader-says (last visited
Sept. 19, 2018) (quoting Judge Rader, “There’s a tension throughout the
system . . . you’ve got an agency with 7,000 people giving birth to property rights,
and then you’ve got, in the same agency, 300 or so people on the back
end . . . acting as death squads, kind of killing property rights”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. Oil State Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
125. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
126. See id. at 1370 (addressing the issue of “whether inter partes review
violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution”).
127. See id. at 1373 (“Inter partes review falls squarely within the
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with the Allergan–Saint Regis deal, raise interesting philosophical
questions about the PTAB’s authority relative to the nature of
patent rights, that is, the extent to which patent rights are like
other property rights.128
Other practitioners claim these fears are hyperbolic.129 Citing
to statistics that these arguments are overdrawn,130 supporters of
IPR think that its opponents are merely protecting their
monopolies on lucrative technologies at the public’s expense.131 A
lobbyist organization supporting IPR whose members include
Amazon, Dell, Google, Intel, and Oracle cite several statistics that
seem to cast doubt on the claim that IPR hinders innovation.132 For
instance, the group notes an increase in research and development
spending, capital venture investments, patent filings, and

public-rights doctrine. . . . Thus, the PTO can [reconsider patents] without
violating Article III.”).
128. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Until recently, most everyone
considered an issued patent a personal right—no less than a home or a
farm— that the federal government could revoke only with the concurrence of
independent judges.”).
129. See Ryan Davis, Law360’s AIA Survival Guide Reveals Tips for PTAB
Success, LAW360 (Sept. 4, 2015, 3:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
698621?scroll=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) (quoting Scott Kamholz, former
PTAB judge, noting that “the board has only invalidated 25 percent of the claims
challenged”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. See Erica Teichert, PTAB Says it’s not a ‘Death Squad’ for Patents,
LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2014, 8:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/528519/ptabsays-it-s-not-a-death-squad-for-patents (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Although
167 patents have been brought to the PTAB for inter partes review . . . , only nine
of those patents have been completely invalidated and another [nineteen] have
had some of their claims thrown out . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
131. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Software and Information Industry
Association in Support of Petitioners, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No.
IPR2016-01127, 2017 WL 6272019 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Software
Industry Association Amicus Brief] (supporting IPR by filing an amicus brief with
the PTAB urging the agency not to grant the Tribe’s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction).
132. See HIGH TECH INVENTOR’S ALLIANCE, AN OPEN LETTER: INNOVATION IS
THRIVING (2017), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3929b0_74c746db8c9e4cf9ad
37421bb614ec02.pdf (presenting data to support the assertion that cancelation of
weak patents is good for innovation).
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increased start-ups to argue that innovation is actually “thriving”
post-IPR.133
As noted, Allergan’s CEO fell into the first camp—that IPR
hampers innovation because the system is unstable for patent
holders and instability is bad for investment.134 To unpack how
Allergan sought to avoid IPR through transacting with the Tribe,
it is necessary to explore the historical justifications for sovereign
immunity as well as the doctrinal development of tribal and state
immunity.
III. Sovereign Immunity
While the linkage between sovereignty and immunity dates
back to the feudal age,135 the survival of sovereign immunity rests
on a variety of justifications that have shifted over time.136 In
pre-colonial British law, the concept of sovereign immunity was
derived from the theory of rex gratia dei, or “king by the grace of
God.”137 The religious explanation for immunity was premised on
the idea that the king, as an extension of God, “can do no wrong.”138
However, the Framers abandoned that religious foundation of
sovereign immunity.139 Instead, sovereign immunity persisted in
the United States initially because of the practical consideration
that states were financially unstable after the Revolutionary War

133. Id.
134. See Saunders, supra note 46 (arguing that IPR puts stress on Allergan’s
“social contract” it has with its patients).
135. See LEON HURWITZ, THE STATES AS DEFENDANT: GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES 10–11 (1981)
(describing how the pyramid structure of the feudal system prevented those on a
lower class from taking action against his superiors).
136. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g,
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (observing that immunity is “a necessary corollary” to a
sovereign’s functions).
137. See HURWITZ, supra note 135, at 18–21 (discussing the evolution of
sovereign immunity in British law through the system of requesting suit from the
government through a petition of right).
138. Id. at 11.
139. See id. at 17 (discussing the Lockean conception of society in which the
people, not the government, were sovereign and thereby dictated the laws).
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and reluctant to open themselves up to liability.140 Later, the Court
repeatedly mentions the “dignitary” interest inherent in sovereign
immunity141 and that it is “a government’s right not to be haled
into court without its consent.”142
These two justifications are reflected in contemporary
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The Court’s commonly cited
justifications for immunity are therefore twofold: to allow the
sovereign to protect its financial143 and dignitary interests.144 In
recent years, especially with respect to state immunity, the Court
has emphasized that the dignitary concern is superior to the
economic justification.145 Hence, the Court finds for sovereign
immunity regardless of the forum or type of relief sought by the
suing party.146 This means that injured parties may be without

140. See id. at 20 (explaining that many of the American colonies were heavily
in debt); MICHAEL SHORTELL, RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND THE IMPACT OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 28–29 (2008) (outlining the indebtedness of each state after
the war and characterizing financial concerns as the driving force behind adoption
of British sovereign immunity doctrine into American life).
141. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“The generation that
designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits
central to sovereign dignity.”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)
(noting that a suit between two private parties may be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment if the damages are paid from a state’s treasury).
142. William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2017).
143. See William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1615 (2013) (arguing that “sovereign immunity
protected the states’ treasuries” as one of the driving justifications of sovereign
immunity jurisprudence).
144. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002)
(acknowledging both objects of sovereign immunity, but ranking dignitary
interests as more important than “protect[ing] state treasuries”).
145. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Supreme Court trend towards
bolstering state immunity, irrespective of whether the plaintiff sues for money
damages, because the vitality of state immunity is concerned primarily with
preserving the dignity of state independence).
146. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (“[W]e have
often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant
to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Alden,
527 U.S. at 749 (“Private suits against nonconsenting States . . . present ‘the
indignity’ of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties, regardless of the forum.”) (citation omitted).
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judicial recourse.147 For this reason, sovereign immunity is not
without its critics.148
Still, sovereign immunity remains a bedrock principle of
American federal jurisprudence.149 The federal government,
states,150 tribes,151 and foreign nations152 all enjoy some species of
sovereign immunity.153 Both statutory and common law shape the
scope of each respective sovereign’s immunity from suit.154
Therefore, to understand the nuances of tribal and state immunity,
it is necessary to review the relevant history, case law, and
legislation affecting sovereignty. Each is discussed in turn.

147. See SHORTELL, supra note 140, at 4 (“To opponents, decisions [upholding
sovereign immunity] are a travesty of justice, denying legal remedy to those who
are harmed by the states.”).
148. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1426 (1987) (arguing that the constitution guarantees both sovereignty and
individual rights, but that the former often trumps the latter at the expense of
the people).
149. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (noting
Congress’s “intention not to alter” tribal sovereign immunity).
150. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (upholding state immunity
in its own courts).
151. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978)
Although we early rejected the notion that Indian tribes are “foreign
states” for jurisdictional purposes under Art. III, . . . we have also
recognized that the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by
government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in many
ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and state
governments.
152. See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 123 (1812) (“[T]he
commander of the national vessel exercises a part of his sovereign power; and in
such a case no consent to submit to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country
can be implied . . . .”).
153. See Wood, supra note 143, at 1621 (“[T]he Supreme Court
unquestioningly applied the sovereign immunity doctrine to foreign, the federal,
and the state governments based on already established and commonly
understood principles.”).
154. See id. at 1591 (discussing the tension between Supreme Court decisions
reluctantly upholding the doctrine in deference to Congress).
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A. Tribal Sovereignty

Tribal sovereignty is premised on a deep history of cultural
and political independence predating the ratification of the
Constitution.155 Tribal sovereignty stems, therefore, not from any
congressional delegation of power, but from tribes’ inherent
sovereignty preceding colonial settlement of North America.156
Tribal sovereignty is, however, subject to congressional “plenary”
control.157 Congress’s control over tribes is premised on roughly
three interrelated constitutional provisions: the Treaty Clause, the
Indian Commerce Clause, and the Property Clause.158
In early Supreme Court jurisprudence, Chief Justice Marshall
authored three foundational decisions159 that articulated the legal
relationship between the United States and Indian nations as dual
sovereigns.160 First, Marshall posited that “[t]he Indian nations
155. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014)
(describing tribes as “separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution”).
156. See White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]ribes
retain whatever inherent sovereignty they had as the original inhabitants of this
continent to the extent that sovereignty has not been removed by Congress.”);
FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231–32 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (discussing the historical roots
of tribal sovereignty).
157. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 217 (describing Congress’s
control over tribes as limited by the strictures of the Constitution).
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with . . . the
Indian Tribes.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the executive treaty
making power with the consent of the senate); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3
(excluding Indians from the legislative’s taxing power); COHEN’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 156, at 207–12 (noting that although there are distinct constitutional
provisions relating to Congress’s power over Indian affairs, “it is somewhat
artificial to analyze the constitutional provisions separately”).
159. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 562 (1823) (“The exclusive right of
the British government to the lands occupied by the Indians, has passed to that
of the United States”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 7 (1831) (“The effect
of [Georgia’s state] laws, and their purposes, are . . . to abolish the Cherokee laws,
and to deprive the Cherokees of the protection of their laws”); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832) (“The constitution, by declaring treaties . . . to be
the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties
with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers
who are capable of making treaties.”).
160. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831) (“[T]he relation of
the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions
which exist no where else.”); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519 (“The whole intercourse
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had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial . . . .”161
Second, he analyzed the Indian tribes as an entity similar to both
states and foreign nations, ultimately describing tribes as
“domestic dependent nations.”162 Moreover, together these
observations established that congressional control over tribes
does not abolish their autonomy altogether.163 Marshall at once
established Native American tribes as sovereigns, but conditioned
tribal political independence on federal control.164
Marshall’s characterization of the federal–Indian dynamic
continues to pervade both the judicial and congressional
development of Indian law.165 Tribes are independent entities yet
“are neither States nor foreign nations—rather, they lie
somewhere between the two.”166 Marshall thereby laid the
foundation for the “trustee” relationship between the federal
government and tribes—as the United States grew towards the
west, the government entered into treaties with tribes that traded
land for protection.167 While dependent on the federal government
between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested
in the government of the United States.”); NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1348, 1354 (D.N.M. 1998) (“Indian tribes and the federal government
are dual sovereigns.”).
161. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519.
162. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
163. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520 (“[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations
is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its right to
self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.”).
164. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 232 (stating that tribal
autonomy is “subject to paramount authority” of the federal government).
165. See In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145, 149 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003) (describing
tribes are “quasi-sovereigns” whose concomitant immunity is distinct from that
possessed by states); Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and
Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009,
1020 (2007) (“The concept that so confounds both Congress and the courts is that,
on one hand, Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, ‘domestic dependent nations’
that are ensconced as a ‘third sovereign’ in the federal framework. On the other
hand, Congress has plenary authority over Indian tribes.”).
166. RICHARD S. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 81-137 GOV, ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: BACKGROUND, NATURE, HISTORY, CURRENT ISSUES,
FUTURE TRENDS 1 (1980) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY].
167. See id. at 1 (discussing the trustee relationship between the federal
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for a multitude of benefits, tribes also retain key independent
political functions—the most important of which is the control over
internal self-government.168 This unique protectorate dynamic
shapes much of the seemingly contradictory concepts in federal
Indian law because the federal government’s control over tribes is
both because of and limited by its trustee responsibilities.169
After Marshall’s establishment of tribes’ sovereign status, the
Court later accepted tribal sovereign immunity as a truism with
little analysis of its legal basis.170 Indeed, the case that is widely
considered the judicial basis of tribal immunity, Turner v. United
States,171 was not a declaration of a novel legal principle so much
as an assumption that a tribe is not liable for its members’ tortious
actions.172 Nevertheless, Turner recognized the general
understanding that tribal sovereignty includes immunity from
suit.173 Tribal immunity was an accepted legal doctrine by the
mid-twentieth century.174
Although judicially created, the legislature has extensive
constitutional authority to shape tribal sovereignty.175 Federal
government and the tribes as stemming from early treaties in which the tribes
ceded land and power in exchange for protection).
168. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (“Although
no longer ‘possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,’ they remain a ‘separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations.’” (internal
citation omitted)).
169. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 220–21 (noting the
“guardian-ward” relationship between the federal government and tribes as both
a source and limit to federal control over tribes).
170. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998) (“Turner’s
passing reference to immunity, however, did become an explicit holding that
tribes had immunity from suit . . . . Later cases, albeit with little analysis,
reiterated the doctrine.”).
171. 248 U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919).
172. See Kiowa, at 757 (“Turner, then, is but a slender reed for supporting the
principle of tribal sovereign immunity.”).
173. See Turner, 248 U.S., at 357–58 (describing the tribe as a “distinct
political community” that, “[l]ike other governments, . . . was free from liability
for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the
peace.”).
174. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)
(“These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional
authorization.”).
175. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014)
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legislation, however, is far from uniform. Policy reform efforts that
influence legislation have shifted in phases—each shift fluctuating
between greater federal control and greater tribal independence.176
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), passed in 1934,
represents one such policy shift.177 Prior to the IRA’s passage, the
19th century approach to tribal regulation was defined by
devastating tribal land allotment and a focus on assimilation with
Anglo-American norms.178 These policies did little to improve
Indian communities and engendered widespread criticism.179 To
address the public outrage at poor living conditions within tribal
communities, the IRA aimed to fundamentally restructure the
federal government’s relationship to tribal entities by giving the
tribes greater political and economic independence.180

(“[T]ribes are subject to plenary control by Congress.”); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify
or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise
possess.”); Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058,
1059 (1982) (discussing the first legislation governing tribal sovereignty); Thomas
P. McLish, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Limits, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 173, 178 (1988) (“Under the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress has
‘plenary’ authority over the tribes.”).
176. See ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 166, at 15
(describing nine major trends in congressional policymaking: “(1) trading;
(2) treatymaking; (3) creation of an administrative structure to effect Federal
policy; (4) removal and concentration westward; (5) establishment of the
reservation system; (6) allotment and citizenship (7) reform and tribal
reorganization; (8) termination; and (9) self-determination”).
177. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479
(1976)).
178. See Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 960 (1972) (describing Meriam Report’s exposure of
Indian-American living conditions ineptly addressed by the federal government).
179. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 144 (explaining the cultural
impact of the Meriam Report, a non-governmental study, as the “primary catalyst
for change” among federal legislators that led to the passage of the IRA).
180. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 201, (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The political climate changed dramatically with the
passage in 1934 of the IRA in which ‘[t]he policy of allotment and sale of surplus
reservation land was repudiated’ as antithetical to tribal interests.”); Id.
(discussing the Wheeler-Howard Bill, a precursor to the Indian Reorganization
Act, which sought to “gradually relinquish” federal power over tribes back to the
tribes themselves to effectuate self-governance).
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The sections most emblematic of the IRA’s purposes are found
in sections 16 and 17.181 Together these sections allow tribes to
create constitutions and by-laws and incorporate under federal
law.182 Federal recognition lent stability to tribal organization,
thereby encouraging private parties to engage commercially with
tribes.183 Furthermore, the Act delineated a tribe’s governmental
unit from its business units.184 When tribes are acting in their
commercial capacity, the IRA permits tribes to include “sue and be
sued” clauses into commercial contracts that constitutes a waiver
of immunity specific to a particular transaction.185 This way a tribe
can waive its immunity as to a specific business dispute without
risking exposure to liability in other contexts.186 The IRA’s intent
to create a bright line distinction between tribal governmental and
commercial activities, however, soon muddied because of ongoing
ideological shifts.187 Additionally, the nature of tribal enterprises
181. See Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, 50 ADVOCATE 19,
20 (2007) (“[Section 17] has as its animating purpose enabling tribes ‘to conduct
business through th[e] modern device’ of corporations.”).
182. Id.
183. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 325 (“Congress intended to
allow the tribes a certain amount of freedom to enter and compete in the private
business world.”); McLish, supra note 175, at 190 (“[A] tribal corporation can
subject itself to suit in order to obtain credit and otherwise engage in normal
business while the tribal government remains protected.”).
184. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons From the Third Sovereign: Indian
Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (“Passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act allowed the tribes to organize their governments, by drafting their own
constitutions, adopting their own laws through tribal councils, and setting up
their own court systems.”); Amelia A. Fogleman, Sovereign Immunity of Indian
Tribes: A Proposal for Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345,
1362 (1993) (“[T]he IRA creates two distinct entities, a tribal government with
sovereign immunity and a tribal corporation, which may waive its immunity.”).
185. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 326 (explaining that while
some courts construe such suability clauses as waivers of immunity, it is specific
“to actions involving the business”).
186. See, e.g., Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia Games, Inc., No.
1:05-CV-0608, 2005 WL 2098056, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (“Section 302(c)
[of the Tribe Ordinance] specifically states that . . . [the] Tribe waives its
immunity ‘only to the extent of the specific terms of the applicable contract or
obligation.’”).
187. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 152 (discussing the
termination phase of federal Indian law, which sought to end federal
programming aimed at helping Indians, thus confusing much of the IRA-era
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rendered the distinction difficult to apply because tribal
government functions are frequently tied to economic ventures for
the purpose of generating revenue.188
Still, courts continue to draw a distinction between a tribe’s
governmental and business functions to determine whether
immunity attaches to a given dispute by assessing whether the
tribal entity is an “arm of the tribe.”189 Among the factors examined
under this test is “whether the purposes of tribal sovereign
immunity are served by granting them immunity.”190 This factor is
quite broad and reflects the notion that tribes, unlike other
sovereigns, face unique obstacles for economically supporting its
members.191 Thus, courts often find that what may facially seem
like a purely commercial activity actually touches tribal
self-governance.192 For instance, tribal-run casinos are often
considered arms of the tribes and therefore immune from suit
because it relates to the tribe’s economic policies.193 That these
tests frequently favor finding for the immunity privilege is in
keeping with the Supreme Court’s recent holding that even a
legislation).
188. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (“Tribal
enterprises now include ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to
non-Indians.”).
189. See White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014)
In determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity as
an “arm of the tribe,” we examine several factors including: “(1) the
method of creation of the economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their
structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of
control the tribe has over the entities; (4) the tribe’s intent with respect
to the sharing of its sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial
relationship between the tribe and the entities.”
190. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629
F.3d 1173, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010).
191. See id. (considering whether policies such as promoting tribal autonomy,
protecting tribal finances, preserving tribal self-determination would be best
served by granting a tribal corporation immunity).
192. See Smith, supra note 181, at 21 (noting that within the “arm of the tribe”
test, court’s focus on the impact that liability will have on a tribe’s economic
functions notwithstanding the tribal government’s detachment from the
underlying business dispute).
193. See Breakthrough Mgmt., 629 F.3d at 1195 (“After considering these
factors, it is patent to us that the Authority and the Casino are so closely related
to the Tribe that they should share in the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.”).
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tribe’s off-reservation commercial activity is protected by tribal
immunity.194
In addition to IRA Section 17 contractual waivers, tribes may
also waive their immunity by consenting to litigation.195 A
litigation waiver is distinct from a contractual waiver because it is
implicit in a tribe’s decision to either initiate suit or voluntarily
participate.196 However, the Supreme Court has held that
immunity still applies to the opposing party’s compulsory
counterclaims.197 Ordinarily, a litigation waiver is contained to a
single proceeding and does not transfer to separate suits that
consider similar issues and parties.198
Like congressional control over tribal sovereignty, Congress
may also abrogate tribal immunity. But Congress has abrogated
tribal immunity sparingly.199 In the limited instances Congress
has chosen to abrogate, its intent to abrogate “cannot be implied
but must be unequivocally expressed”200 in “explicit legislation.”201
194. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (“Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on
contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities
and whether they were made on or off a reservation.”); Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (upholding Kiowa).
195. 42 LONNIE E. GRIFFITH, JR., C.J.S. INDIANS § 50 (2018).
196. Id.
197. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (“Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity merely by filing
an action for injunctive relief.”). But see Regents of Univ. of New Mexico v. Knight,
321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We thus hold that when a state files suit
in federal court to enforce its claims to certain patents, the state shall be
considered to have consented to have litigated in the same forum all compulsory
counterclaims . . . .”).
198. See Patent Owner’s Supplemental Brief on Litigation Waiver, Mylan
Pharm. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01132, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 12, 2018)
(“[W]aiver cannot extend from one proceeding to another.”); GRIFFITH, supra note
195, § 50 (“A tribe’s voluntary participation in administrative proceedings does
not waive its immunity in a subsequent court action filed by another party
seeking review of the agency proceedings.”).
199. See Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: Tribal Immunity, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 273, 273 (1998) (“Congress, far from abrogating the now-developed judicially
constructed doctrine, has made few references to the doctrine in legislation.”);
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 246 (noting that federal limitations on
tribal self-government “are few and are to be construed strictly”).
200. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
201. White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Allowing an implied congressional waiver of immunity would
impede Congress’s deliberate and measured choice to abrogate or
limit immunity in specified contexts.202 Therefore, when
determining whether a statute abrogates tribal immunity, courts
construe a legislative ambiguity in favor of tribes.203
B. Tribal Economic Liberty and Self-Determination
The
latest
trend
in
federal
Indian
policy
is
self-determination.204 The era of self-determination endorses the
idea that “Indian tribes are the basic governmental units of Indian
policy.”205 Effectuating this program, however, can be difficult.206
Regulatory expansion amongst countless separate agencies led to
increased bureaucracy and, in turn, a concern that the federal
government was not discharging its trustee duties effectively.207
Therefore, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination Act
of 1975 to increase tribal control over Indian programming.208 The
Act is noted among Indian law scholars as the most symbolic
legislation embracing the policy of self-determination. 209 Congress
firmly states that “the prolonged Federal domination of Indian
service programs has served to retard rather than enhance the
202. See In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 175, at 1060
(“[A]n implied waiver exception would undermine the federal concern for tribal
political and economic development.”).
203. Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 685 F.3d 1224, 1232–33
(11th Cir. 2012) (“[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians,
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”) (citation omitted).
204. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 180 (noting the era of
self-determination as beginning in 1961).
205. Id. at 181.
206. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 188–191 (discussing the
legislative and administrative programs that began to extend programs to
including Indians, such as public housing programs and job training programs).
207. See id. at 191 (“Dispersion of Indian programs among many federal
agencies acting under the auspices of several congressional committees may have
reduced Congress’s ability to uphold trust duties through sufficient oversight of
legislative impact on the exercise of Indian rights.”).
208. 25 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
209. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 719; DAVID GETCHES ET AL.,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 110–11 (1979).
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progress of Indian people and their communities by depriving
Indians of the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial
to the realization of self-government . . . .”210 Flowing from this
policy statement, a series of laws were passed to enable economic
self-sufficiency, including revolving credit loans and job training
programs.211
Examining the role of immunity as it relates to tribal economic
independence in light of self-determination poses an interesting
dynamic. Many scholars argue that strict adherence to sovereign
immunity impinges tribes’ economic independence because third
party investors are deterred by instability that immunity
inherently creates.212 Ordinarily, a tribe’s immunity from suit
forecloses creditors’ willingness to extend loans to an organization
that is legally protected from securing its debts.213
As it relates to the Allergan–Saint Regis deal, though, it is
precisely the Saint Regis Tribe’s immunity that led to the business
opportunity. Far from deterring private business opportunities,
the tribe’s immunity was the very reason Allergan conducted
business with the Tribe. In essence, Saint Regis successfully
“forge[d] the shield of sovereign immunity into an economic
sword.”214
C. State Sovereignty
While similar in some respects, it is helpful to observe the
distinction between tribal and state sovereignty through the lens
of federalism.215 The tension between the federal government and
210. 25 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1).
211. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 719 (summarizing legislation
passed in response to a call for economic development).
212. See, e.g., Fogleman, supra note 184, at 1361 (“Courts, legal scholars, and
some tribes have recognized that at least a partial waiver of sovereign immunity
may be necessary before other parties will enter into business arrangements with
a tribal enterprise.”).
213. McLish, supra note 175, at 189 (“Potential commercial partners or
lenders may be reluctant to deal with a party who is immune from suit.”).
214. Fogleman, supra note 184, at 1380.
215. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)
(“[I]mmunity possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of the
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states, and its effect on sovereignty, is illustrated in the peculiar
history of the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
came about directly in response to the Court’s contentious
decision216 in Chisholm v. Georgia.217 There, the Court held that
Article III218 permits a federal court to hear a suit between a
private citizen and the state of Georgia because Article III states
that federal courts have jurisdiction over controversies arising
“between a State and Citizens of another State.”219
Justice Iredell’s dissent, however, would later become the
meaning of state sovereignty.220 He argued that the majority’s
holding, although textually logical was contrary to history, usage,
and the Framer’s vision of state sovereignty.221 The Chisholm
decision is widely noted to “shock[]”222 the American political
understanding because it was so divergent from the settled view
that a state was immune from suit brought by a private citizen.223
In response, Congress drafted, and the states thereafter
ratified, the Eleventh Amendment.224 The Eleventh Amendment
States.”); In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145, 149 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003) (“The doctrine of
tribal immunity developed under federal common law and is similar, but not
identical, to the sovereign immunity of States as preserved by the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
216. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789–1801 196 (1997) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment was
proposed the day after Chisholm was decided).
217. 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
218. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
219. Id.
220. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting Justice Iredell’s
Chisholm dissent that it was “well established” that a sovereign could not be sued
without its consent in its own courts).
221. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 437–450 (1793) (Iredell, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing English law and early U.S. common law and concluding
“that the suit in question cannot be maintained”).
222. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
223. See James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory”
Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1278 (1998) (“The
Chisholm decision does appear to have fallen upon the country with a profound
shock, and does appear to have touched off a widespread political reaction leading
to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
224. See CURRIE, supra note 216, at 196–197 (discussing the passage of the
Eleventh Amendment and the rejection of any proposals to “water down” its main
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reads, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State . . . .”225 Ironically, despite the public outrage in response to
Chisolm, the literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment is rather
narrow. It proscribes a private citizen of one state from suing
another state. Yet, neither the Court226 nor scholars have
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to be so limited because of
the history between Chisholm and the subsequent passage of the
Eleventh Amendment.227 Thus, because of the Eleventh
Amendment’s extra-textual understanding, state sovereign
immunity, and its relationship to the Eleventh Amendment, is
anything but settled.228
Because of this history, the scope of state sovereignty has since
developed detached from its textual anchor.229 Instead, the
proposition).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
226. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10 (finding that a citizen of Louisiana is barred
from suing the state of Louisiana in federal court, even though under federal
question jurisdiction); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322
(1934) (“We cannot . . . assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”).
227. See James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign
Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After
Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 167 (1998) (“Despite the Eleventh
Amendment’s language, which bars only two disfavored suitors from bringing suit
against the states in federal court, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted
the amendment to prohibit individuals and foreign states themselves from suing
states in federal court.”); Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, and
Sovereign Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 605, 617–18 (2001) (“[I]t is not immediately clear how to construe the
Amendment, and current commentators not only engage in extratextual
analysis, but also seem to ignore or radically alter the text.”).
228. See Pfander, supra note 223, at 1275 (making a revisionist argument
that the Eleventh Amendment should be understood for the benefit of a national
fiscal policy as opposed to the basis of state sovereign immunity).
229. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (“The phrase [Eleventh Amendment
immunity] is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment.”); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and
the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1666 (2004) (“[I]t
is a familiar reality that almost none of the Court’s important cases involving the
[Eleventh] Amendment deal with matters that fall within its terms.”); Hans, 134
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doctrinal evolution of state sovereign immunity relies on “history
and experience, and the established order of things.”230 That is,
Eleventh Amendment immunity is derived from the structure and
understanding of the original Constitution.231 In recent decades,232
Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine has become largely
impenetrable by the federal government, regardless of whether
suit is brought in the state’s own court,233 in federal court,234 or in
an administrative proceeding.235 There are, however, a few narrow
exceptions.236
First, states, like tribes, can waive their immunity.237 Such
waiver can be implicit or explicit. For instance, a state may waive
its immunity by specifically declaring a waiver of immunity via
statute or by consenting to a court’s jurisdiction.238 Similar to
U.S. at 10 (finding that a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment would create
an “anomalous result”).
230. Alden, 527 U.S. at 727 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)).
231. See id. at 728 (“[T]he scope of the States’ immunity from suit is
demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design.”).
232. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling
Union Gas, which held Congress could abrogate state immunity via the commerce
clause).
233. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743 (1999) (“In light of history,
practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States
retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.”).
234. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76 (“The Eleventh Amendment
prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in
federal court.”).
235. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(“Given both th[e] interest in protecting States’ dignity and the strong similarities
between [administrative] proceedings and civil litigation, we hold that state
sovereign immunity bars the [agency] from adjudicating complaints filed by a
private party against a nonconsenting State.”).
236. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 227, at 168 (describing six exceptions to
state immunity, namely Ex Parte Young which allows a suit to be brought against
a state official in his individual capacity).
237. See Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17, 24 (1st
Cir. 2001) (“It has long been recognized that a state’s sovereign immunity is ‘a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.’”).
238. See id. at 24–25 (noting that a state can waive immunity by either
express statutory or constitutional statement an unequivocal waiver or
affirmative conduct in litigation).

1740

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1703 (2018)

consent, a state’s participation in a federal program may constitute
a waiver.239
However, the state’s participation constitutes a waiver only if
the federal program in question explicitly conditions a state’s
participation on waiver.240 Therefore, “[t]he question of waiver or
consent
under
the
Eleventh
Amendment . . . turn[s]
on . . . whether the State by its participation in the program
authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation
of that immunity.”241 This is in keeping with protecting both a
state’s dignitary interests and its financial interests. Because
states can choose whether to engage in the federal program
knowing it could be subjected to liability, the state engages in a
cost-benefit analysis of whether to risk liability for the benefit of
participating in the federal programing.
Second, Congress can abrogate state immunity.242 States are
presumed to have immunity from suit in federal courts.243
Congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity hinges
first on the initial hurdle of whether Congress’s intent to abrogate
was clear,244 and second, whether Congress is acting pursuant to
an enumerated competence to abrogate.245 Yet, Congress’s
inherent legislative power does include the automatic ability to
239. See id. at 24 (“[A] state may also explicitly waive the protections of the
Eleventh Amendment by choosing to participate in a federal program . . . .”).
240. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“The mere fact that a
State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides
assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient
to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.”).
241. Id. at 672.
242. See MICHAEL P. ALLEN, MICHAEL FINCH & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, FEDERAL
COURTS: CONTEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 504 (2d ed. 2015) (noting congressional
abrogation as a limitation on state immunity).
243. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (finding that despite any
ambiguity in the Eleventh Amendment, the Constitution presumes that states
are immunity from suit in federal court).
244. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 242, at 504 (“[B]ecause of the importance of
state sovereign immunity in the federal system, Congress must be extraordinarily
clear about its intent to alter the federal-state balance.”).
245. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (“[W]hether
Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States’ immunity from suit
is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to
a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?”).
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abridge state sovereignty.246 Because the Court considers Eleventh
Amendment immunity suits based on “history, practice, precedent,
and the structure of the Constitution,”247 inherent in this inquiry
is the principle of comity.248
The Court’s propensity to reaffirm state autonomy beyond the
bounds of the Eleventh Amendment has escalated in keeping with
the constitutional trend of “New Federalism.”249 New Federalism,
a term coined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, promotes a shift towards
limiting federal power and necessarily reinforcing state
autonomy.250 The aims of New Federalism are particularly geared
toward limiting congressional competence pursuant to the
commerce clause.251 Such efforts are observable in Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.252
In Seminole Tribe, the Court overtly overruled a prior case,
finding that Congress cannot abrogate state immunity under its

246. See id. at 72 (“Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 371 (1999) (“The Constitution, by
delegating to Congress the power to establish the supreme law of the land when
acting within its enumerated powers, does not foreclose a State from asserting
immunity . . . .”).
247. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
248. See Note, Reconciling State Sovereign Immunity with the Fourteenth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1068 (2016) [hereinafter Reconciling State
Sovereign Immunity] (“[T]he balance between state autonomy and federal rights
turns in large part on a concept not designed with dual federalism in mind: state
sovereign immunity.”).
249. See In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 175, at 1074– 75
(“[T]he constitutional protection of state sovereignty has been bolstered in recent
years under the banner of the new federalism.”).
250. See Reconciling State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 248, at 1073 (“[I]n
the mid-1990s, the Rehnquist Court was caught in the throes of a federalism
revolution that emphasized the rights of states against the federal government in
a number of constitutional areas.”).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (finding that
Congress exceeded its authority under the commerce clause to pass the Gun–Free
School Zones Act of 1990).
252. 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15
(1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(“Congress has the authority to abrogate States’ immunity when acting pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.”).
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commerce clause authority.253 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
Congress may abrogate state immunity only under the Fourteenth
Amendment254 because, unlike the commerce clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment authorized congressional intrusion into
state sovereignty via its enforcement clause.255 Furthermore, by
declaring that the “Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to
dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area . . . that is under
the exclusive control of the Federal Government,”256 Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that whether a state is immune from suit
turns not on whether Congress is acting within its traditional
authority, but whether in doing so it offends state independence.257
Seminole Tribe seemed to effectively foreclose Congress from
abrogating state immunity when acting in accordance with any
Article I power.258
After Seminole Tribe and its progeny, there are only a few
narrow circumstances in which Congress can abrogate state
immunity.259 One limited circumstance in which state immunity
yields to federal lawmaking arises in the context of in rem
proceedings.260 A prerequisite for a federal court to hear a claim
253. See id. at 66 (“We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly
decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.”).
254. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
255. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (“[T]he bounds of Article III could be
expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other
than the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
256. See id. at 77.
257. See id. at 72 (“Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States.”).
258. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 242, at 527.
259. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004)
(“States, nonetheless, may still be bound by some judicial actions without their
consent.”); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (holding that Congress, due to
Enforcement Clause, may abrogate state immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment).
260. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006) (finding that
a state is bound to comply with a bankruptcy discharge notwithstanding state
immunity); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 494–95 (1998)
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requires one of three species of personal jurisdiction: in personam,
in rem, or quasi-in rem jurisdiction.261 The first is required for a
court to adjudicate a claim involving a particular person or
entity,262 whereas the latter two types of jurisdiction allow a
federal court to hear claims concerning property located within its
jurisdiction.263 The purpose of in rem jurisdiction is to settle claims
to property against the entire world.264 For instance, bankruptcy
courts have in rem jurisdiction over all creditors’ claims to the
debtor’s assets, regardless of whether the creditor is joined in the
action.265 The bankruptcy court nevertheless has jurisdiction to
distribute the debtor’s remaining assets and cancel further
liabilities as to the rest of the world.266
Ordinarily,
“[s]overeign
immunity
affects
personal
267
jurisdiction.” But in bankruptcy, the court’s jurisdiction is based
on the rem, not the persona. For this reason, states cannot assert
immunity.268 In Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,269 the
Court found that “a proceeding initiated by a debtor to determine
the dischargeability of a . . . debt is not a suit against the State for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.”270 Interestingly, the Court
(“We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the jurisdiction of a
federal court over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the
State’s possession.”).
261. JAMES WM. MOORE, ALLAN D. VESTAL, PHILLIP B. KURKLAND, 1 MOORE’S
MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6.01 (2017).
262. See id. (“Personal jurisdiction refers to court’s ability to assert judicial
authority over particular parties and bind them by its adjudication.”).
263. Id. § 6.20.
264. Id.
265. See Katz, 546 U.S. at 369 (“Bankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood today
and at the time of the framing, is principally in rem jurisdiction.”).
266. See Hood, 541 U.S. at 447 (summarizing typical Chapter 7 bankruptcy
procedure and relief, which ultimately “provide[s] the debtor a fresh start, despite
the lack of participation of all of his creditors, because the court’s jurisdiction is
premised on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors”).
267. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569, 578 (2017)
(Stephens, J., dissenting).
268. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004).
(“[E]xercise of [a court’s] in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does not infringe
state sovereignty.”).
269. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
270. Id. at 443; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996)
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did not reach the original issue on appeal of whether Congress may
abrogate state immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.271 In
so holding, the majority gave less attention to the fact that the
proceeding was adversarial, but focused instead on the unique
nature of bankruptcy, and the pragmatic concern that a debtor can
cancel some debts, but not those where the state is the creditor.272
Generally speaking, a federal bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
over a state notwithstanding its ordinary Eleventh Amendment
immunity in district court litigation.273
What then is the role of sovereign immunity, state or tribal, in
administrative adjudications that are similar, but distinct from
traditional litigation? In recent years the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit, district courts, and the USPTO have struggled to
determine a clear answer.274 The following discussion outlines the
jurisprudential developments that inform the consideration of
tribal immunity in IPR.

(explaining that state sovereignty is a “background principle” in federal court);
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 242, at 526 (noting that although Seminole Tribe’s broad
principle that Congress cannot abrogate by way of its Article I powers, bankruptcy
poses a strange exception).
271. Hood, 541 U.S. at 443.
272. See id. at 455 (“[A]s the Court concludes today, the in rem nature of
bankruptcy proceedings might affect the ability of a debtor to obtain, by motion,
a bankruptcy court determination that affects a creditor-State’s rights.”).
273. See id. at 448 (“Under our longstanding precedent, States, whether or
not they choose to participate in the proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court’s
discharge order no less than other creditors.”).
274. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(finding the Federal Maritime Commission’s procedures sufficiently similar to
litigation to warrant dismissal due to state immunity); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators
of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying the FMC standard
to patent interference proceedings); Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm.
Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“IPR is neither clearly a judicial
proceeding instituted by a private party nor clearly and enforcement action
brought by the federal government.”); Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor
Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *3 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017)
(finding that state immunity applies to IPR).
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IV. The Intersection of Intellectual Property and
Sovereign Immunity
The doctrines of intellectual property and sovereign immunity
have increasingly converged in the past two decades. The following
discussion is an introduction to the cases that preceded the
Allergan-Saint Regis Mohawk transaction and bare on its judicial
treatment.
A. The Doctrinal Development of Patent Law and
Sovereign Immunity
One of the first cases where the Supreme Court considered
state sovereign immunity relative to patent rights was Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank.275 There, the Court held that Congress is not
authorized to abrogate state immunity pursuant to the Patent
Clause under the reasoning of Seminole Tribe.276 College Savings
Bank invented a patented program that helped parents finance
college education.277 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, an arm of the state of Florida, crafted a similar
program for Florida residents.278 College Savings Bank brought an
infringement action against Florida Prepaid under the Patent
Remedy Act,279 which unequivocally abrogated state immunity.280
Although the first requirement for congressional abrogation was
met,281 the Court nevertheless found that Seminole Tribe
275. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
276. Id. at 636 (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent
Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent
Clause.”).
277. Id. at 631.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994), held unconstitutional by Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (“Any
State . . . shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution
of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit
in Federal court . . . for infringement of a patent.”).
281. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635 (1999) (“[We] must answer two
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foreclosed Congress from abrogating state immunity pursuant to
its Article I powers.282
Three years after Florida Prepaid, the Court recognized that
states sovereign immunity privilege may extend to some
administrative proceedings.283 Although not directly bearing on
patent law, this is significant because before this case, Eleventh
Amendment immunity was presumed in Article III courts, not in
Article II executive agency adjudications.284 In Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,285 the Court
acknowledged some differences between the Federal Maritime
Commission’s (FMC) proceeding and traditional litigation, but
nevertheless found that those differences had no bearing on
whether it would be an affront to state sovereignty to subject it to
the proceeding.286 Justice Thomas’ decision, in accordance with the
Court’s trend towards robust state autonomy, is rife with
federalism rhetoric.287 Indeed, FMC’s reasoning was rooted in the
general principle that the state’s “dignity” must be protected.288
The FMC standard, therefore, established the framework that
questions: first, whether Congress has unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to
abrogate the immunity . . . .”).
282. Id. at 636.
283. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 760
[I]f the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State’s
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in
federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found it
acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the
administrative tribunal of an agency, such as the FMC.
284. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 242, at 533 (“[T]he Court . . . expanded
sovereign immunity to include the Article II executive branch.”).
285. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
286. See id. at 762 (finding that any distinction between the FMC’s proceeding
and district court litigation is “it is a distinction without a meaningful
difference”).
287. See id. at 769 (“By guarding against encroachments by the Federal
Government on fundamental aspects of state sovereignty, such as sovereign
immunity, we strive to maintain the balance of power embodied in our
Constitution and thus to ‘reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991))).
288. See id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the “predicate” for the
majority’s opinion is the “‘preeminent’ interest in according States the ‘dignity’
that is their due”).
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dictates sovereign immunity application in an administrative
proceeding.289 This framework was then applied to patent
administrative hearings.
Applying FMC, the Federal Circuit impliedly found that the
Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine applied to interference
proceedings at the PTO in Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of University
of Missouri.290 Interference proceedings were a pre-America
Invents Act proceeding initiated by the PTO to determine priority
between two competing inventors.291 It allows an inventor of a
pending patent application to initiate review of another competing
patent to determine which applicant invented first.292 Because the
AIA converted the American patent system to a first-to-file, rather
than a first-to-invent regime, interference proceedings are obsolete
for patents filed after March 2013.293 Despite this, Vas-Cath
influenced the PTAB’s consideration of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in IPR.294
Here, the University of Missouri successfully interfered with
Vas-Cath’s patent.295 Vas-Cath then appealed the Board’s finding
of priority to federal district court.296 The significant holding in
Vas-Cath was that the University of Missouri waived its immunity
289. See id. at 751 (finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies
where a “proceeding walks, talks, and squawks like a lawsuit”).
290. 473 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]nterference proceedings in the
PTO . . . can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit.”).
291. Pub. L. No. 98–622, 98 Stat. 3383, amended by Leahy–Smith America
Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. 135(a) (2011)).
292. See Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1378 (“A patent interference proceeding, 35
U.S.C. § 135, is conducted for the purpose of determining priority of invention as
between competing applicants for patent on the same invention.”).
293. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act Implementation: Patent
Examination, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/americainvents-act-aia/patents-examination#heading-10 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“The
First Inventor to File (FITF) provisions transition the U.S. to a first-inventor-tofile system from a first-to-invent system.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
294. See, e.g., Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No.
IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *2 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017) (“Accordingly,
under FMC and Vas–Cath, inter partes reviews are similar to lawsuits.”).
295. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379.
296. Id.
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by instituting the interference proceeding.297 When Vas-Cath then
appealed the result of the interference proceeding to federal court,
the University of Missouri could not then invoke immunity to
evade review of a favorable decision—rather, the University
waived immunity by participating in an adversarial PTO
proceeding.298 The analysis that would inform subsequent PTAB
decisions, however, was the Federal Circuit’s analytically thin
comparison of interference proceedings to civil litigation under
FMC.299 The Federal Circuit concluded that PTO interference
proceedings contain procedural characteristics like “adverse
parties, examination and cross-examination by deposition of
witnesses, production of documentary evidence, findings by an
impartial federal adjudicator, and power to implement the
decision” that support a finding that Eleventh Amendment
immunity likely applies.300
The PTAB has now applied the FMC framework to find that a
number of state university-held patents are immune from IPR
review.301 First among them was Covidien LP v. University of
297. See id. at 1378 (“By requesting and participating in the interference
proceeding in the PTO, the University waived its constitutional immunity not
only in that proceeding but also in the appeal taken by the losing party.”).
298. See id. at 1385 (“The University initiated and participated in the
contested PTO interference against Vas–Cath; we conclude that the University
cannot both retain the fruits of that action and bar the losing party from its
statutory right of review, even if that review is conducted in federal court.”).
299. See id. at 1382 (“Like proceedings in the Federal Maritime Commission,
contested interference proceedings in the PTO bear ‘strong similarities’ to civil
litigation . . . .”).
300. Id.
301. See Covidien LP v. Univ. Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016–01274,
2017 WL 4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (“[W]e conclude that Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies to inter partes review proceedings, and that
UFRF, having shown it is an arm of the State of Florida, is entitled to assert its
sovereign immunity as a defense to the institution of an inter partes review of the
‘251 patent.’”); Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Maryland, No. IPR2016-00208, at *20
(P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017) (“[T]he University has shown sufficiently that it may
raise Eleventh Amendment Immunity as a defense in this inter partes review
proceeding.”); Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914,
2017 WL 2992429, at *3 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017) (“Given the presence of
‘adjudicatory characteristics’ that were found to make agency proceedings similar
to civil litigation in FMC and Vas–Cath, we consider it more likely that inter
partes reviews have sufficient in personam character for the Eleventh
Amendment to apply.”).
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Florida Research Foundation, Inc.302 There, the petitioner,
Covidien, petitioned for review of University of Florida Research
Foundation’s patent, an arm of the State of Florida.303 Florida
moved to dismiss, invoking its state immunity privilege to shield
itself from Covidien’s cancelation claim.304 The issue was whether
FMC was applicable—whether Eleventh Amendment immunity
was applicable—in an IPR proceeding.305 Covidien argued first
that, like non-infringement of Article III or the Seventh
Amendment as argued by the petitioner in Oil States,306
adjudication of patent rights in an administrative proceeding does
not implicate the Eleventh Amendment.307 The PTAB rightly
rejected Covidien’s argument, finding that whether the Eleventh
Amendment is enforceable in a particular proceeding does not turn
on the same considerations as the Article III and Seventh
Amendment issues.308
Rather, the PTAB found that application of Eleventh
Amendment immunity hinges on whether the state is called upon
to defend itself in an adversarial proceeding against a private
party, thus offending the state’s sovereign dignity.309 UFRF, using
the framework established in FMC, illustrated the similarities
between IPR and district court litigation.310 The PTAB agreed,
finding that “[o]n the whole, considering the nature of inter partes
review and civil litigation, we conclude that the considerable
resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the

302. No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. 2017).
303. See id. *12–17 (analyzing whether UFRF is an arm of the state of the
Florida by analyzing facts drawn from Florida’s agency law).
304. Id. at *1.
305. Id. at *5.
306. Covidien relied on MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d
1284, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which addressed issues identical to those argued in
Oil States.
307. Covidien LP, 2017 WL 4015009, at *5.
308. See id. (finding Covidien’s argument “unpersuasive”).
309. See id. at *6 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58
(1996) that “the doctrine’s central purpose is to accord the States the respect owed
them as joint sovereigns”).
310. See id. at *10–11 (listing such similarities with filing a
petition/complaint, discovery, and protection of confidential information).
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immunity afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment.”311
Therefore, the PTAB found that the FMC rationale similarly
applies in an IPR proceeding.312
It is against this background that the Tribe approached
Allergan with the licensing scheme designed to protect Restasis
from IPR review.
B. The “Sham” Transaction in District Court
Amidst the recent development of sovereign immunity in
administrative proceedings,313 the contentious constitutionality of
IPRs,314 and the morass of Indian law315 lies the Allergan–Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe deal.316 But the Restasis patent litigation
predates the sensational transaction by nearly two years.317
Allergan initiated the suit in the Eastern District of Texas in 2015,
claiming that a number of generic drug companies318 infringed
Allergan’s Restasis patents.319 In response, the defendants
asserted the affirmative defense of invalidity.320
311. Id. at *11.
312. Id. at *6.
313. See Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No. IPR2016-00208 (P.T.A.B. May 23,
2017) (upholding the finding that state immunity applies in IPR).
314. See supra Part II.B (discussing the issue litigated in Oil States—whether
patent rights are private property rights that can only be adjudicated in an Article
III court).
315. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (“Federal Indian
policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic.”).
316. See Allergan Press Release, supra note 31 (“Allergan . . . and the Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe today announced that the Tribe now owns all patents for
RESTASIS . . . and that Allergan has been granted exclusive licenses in the
patents related to the product.”).
317. See Allergan’s E.D. Texas Complaint, supra note 36, at 1 (bringing an
action for infringement of patents “relating to Allergan’s treatment for chronic
dry eye, Restasis®”).
318. The defendant generic drug companies include Teva Pharmaceuticals,
USA, Inc., Apotex Corp., Akorn, Inc., and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and their
respective affiliates. Id. Together these companies are referenced throughout this
Note as the “generic pharmaceutical companies.”
319. Allergan’s E.D. Texas Complaint, supra note 36, at 1.
320. Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaim at 146, Allergan, Inc. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
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Apparently inspired by Covidien, the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe approached Allergan with a patent transfer proposal.321 As
noted, Allergan transferred the Restasis patents to the Tribe
conditioned on the related license agreement worth $13.75 million
dollars upfront and $3.75 million quarterly in royalties
thereafter.322 In exchange, the Tribe agreed to move to dismiss suit
in any USPTO examination proceedings and license operational
use of the Restasis patents back to Allergan.323 Notably, the
agreement did not contemplate a similar covenant to dismiss suits
brought in district court.324 Because the district court litigation
here was initiated by Allergan, the infringement suit constituted a
waiver of any immunity now afforded by the Tribe in the district
court action.325
Importantly, the Patent Assignment Agreement distributes
various legal rights between the parties as licensor (the Tribe) and
licensee (Allergan).326 Patent ownership includes a number of
different legal rights,327 much like the “bundle of sticks” metaphor
used in property law.328 Furthermore, a license agreement between
2017).
321. See Allergan Press Release, supra note 31 (announcing the Restasis
assignment).
322. Mylan Pharm. Inc. vs. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01132 (P.T.A.B. June
3, 2016), Exhibit 2086 Patent Assignment Agreement at §§ 4.1, 4.2 [hereinafter
Patent License Agreement].
323. See Patent License Agreement at § 10.8.9
Licensor has not and agrees that it will not waive its . . . sovereign
immunity in relation to any inter partes review or any other proceeding
in the United States Patent & Trademark Office or any administrative
proceeding that may be filed for the purpose of invalidating or
rendering unenforceable any Licensed Patents.
324. Id.
325. See GRIFFITH, JR., supra note 195, at § 50 (explaining the tribal litigation
waiver doctrine, whereby a tribal sovereign may waive its immunity from suit by
participating in litigation). But see Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No.
IPR2017–01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (finding that
sovereign immunity waiver is not forum-limited).
326. Patent License Agreement, supra note 322, at Preamble.
327. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
328. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 203 F. Supp. 3d
436, 443 (D. Del. 2016) (“A patent is ‘a bundle of rights which may be divided and
assigned, or retained in whole or part.’”); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274,
278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a
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the patent holder and licensee distributes rights amongst the
parties, but transfers “something less than full title and rights” to
the licensee.329 The significant rights distributed here, as set out
in the Patent Assignment Agreement, include the right to (1) sue
for infringement, (2) exclusively make, use, and sell Restasis, and
(3) reversionary rights.330
Once Allergan transferred the patents to the Tribe, Allergan
moved to join Saint Regis to the Eastern District of Texas suit.331
The court ordered Allergan to submit briefs answering questions
to substantiate and legitimize the transaction.332 Notably, Judge
Bryson, a Federal Circuit judge sitting by designation, exhibited
skepticism about the transaction from the moment Allergan moved
to join the Tribe—framing the issue as whether the transaction
was a “sham.”333
Notwithstanding Judge Bryson’s apprehension, he granted
Allergan’s motion to join the Tribe to the litigation.334
Nevertheless, he embraced the opportunity to voice his “serious
concerns” about the legitimacy of the transaction.335 Judge Bryson
articulated two sub-issues pertinent to joining the Tribe as party
to the lawsuit: (1) whether the transaction is “legitimate”336 and
(2) whether the licensing agreement transferred “all substantial
rights” back to Allergan, making Allergan the actual patent holder

collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute
property.”).
329. Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 618
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
330. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *20–34 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (analyzing
rights distributed from the Tribe to Allergan under the license agreement).
331. See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB,
2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (“Allergan moved to substitute
the Tribe as the plaintiff in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(c), which the defendants opposed.”).
332. See id. at *1 (requesting the parties submit briefs on whether the tribe
should be joined as co-plaintiff).
333. Id.
334. Id. at *5.
335. Id. at *2.
336. Id.
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despite the assignment.337 Only the substantial rights issue is
within the scope of the PTAB’s authority and, as noted in Part
IV.B, was central to the PTAB’s treatment of the Restasis patents.
First, the legitimacy of the patent transfer contemplates the
policy considerations underlying the invocation of tribal sovereign
immunity relative to patent rights.338 That is, the court explicitly
questions whether such a transaction distorts the role of tribal
sovereign immunity to such an extent that it violates public
policy.339 Likening the deal to an abusive tax shelter,340 the
decision describes the transaction as treating sovereign immunity
as a “monetizable commodity” to “evade legal responsibility.”341 As
such, Judge Bryson hinted that the contract might be voidable on
policy grounds.342 Finally, without actually holding the transaction
invalid, the court expressed its “serious reservations” about the
widespread implications of the transaction.343
Second, the court inquired whether the license agreement
transferred “all substantial rights” back to Allergan, thereby
effectively maintaining Allergan as the patentee.344 An assignment
and license differ in that “[a]n assignment of patent rights operates
to transfer title to the patent, while a license leaves title in the
patent owner and transfers something less than full title and
rights.”345 Therefore, distinguishing between an assignment and a
337. Id.
338. See id. at *3 (citing to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 178–179,
186 establishing the standard for holding a contract void as against public policy).
339. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017
WL 4619790, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
340. See id. (noting that the Allergan–Saint Regis transaction and abusive
tax shelters share the same concern: “[W]hether the party invoking a particular
legal protection has engaged in a bona fide transaction of the sort for which that
legal protection was intended.”).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See id. at *2 (“Allergan’s tactic, if successful, could spell the end of the
PTO’s IPR program . . . .”).
344. See id. at *3 (“[T]he Tribe would not be considered the owner of the
patents if, through the exclusive license agreement, it has transferred all
substantial rights in the patents except for the right to receive royalties on the
sale of Restasis.”).
345. Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 619
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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license hinges on whether “all substantial rights” were transferred
to the licensee.346 Which rights constitute “all substantial rights”
such to determine patent ownership is not comprised of a “complete
list of rights.”347 However, the Federal Circuit identified that a
patentee’s “retained rights to sue,” among other rights, is an
“important factor.”348
Here, Judge Bryson conceded that the substantial rights issue
was a “close one.”349 Allergan argued that the Tribe maintained
largely educational rights to use the patents along with “first right
to sue third parties not related to Restasis bioequivalents.”350 Still,
the court was largely unimpressed that the rights retained by the
Tribe were sufficient to establish its patentee status.351 In
particular, Judge Bryson noted that the limitation on Allergan’s
otherwise exclusive right to operationalize and manufacture
Restasis in the United States gives the Tribe some “nominal
rights” with little “practical value.”352
Resignedly granting Allergan’s motion to join without holding
definitively on either the transaction validity or the substantial
rights issue,353 Judge Bryson’s sharp disapproval of the transaction
was ultimately dicta.354 More conclusive was the district court’s
holding that the patents-at-issue were invalid on obviousness
grounds.355 Moreover, because Saint Regis did not move to dismiss
346. See id. at 618 (“‘[T]he entire exclusive patent right’ must include all
substantial rights in the patent.”).
347. Id. at 619.
348. Id.
349. Allergan Inc., 2017 WL 4619790, at *4.
350. Id.
351. See id. (“There is no doubt that at least with respect to the patent rights
that protect Restasis against third-party competitors, Allergan has retained all
substantial rights in the patents, and the Tribe enjoys only the right to a revenue
stream in the form of royalties.”).
352. Id.
353. See id. (finding that “the validity of the assignment and exclusive license
transaction . . . do[es] not bear on this Court’s power to hear this case”).
354. Id. at *3.
355. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 135, Allergan, Inc. v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 16, 2017) (“Allergan is not entitled to renewed patent rights for Restasis in
the form of a second wave of patent protection.”).

PATENTLY ABSURD

1755

the suit on immunity grounds, “the assignment d[id] not operate
as a bar to th[e] Court’s continued exercise of its jurisdiction over
th[e] matter.”356 Because Allergan initiated the infringement suit
in the first instance, the Tribe, as the predecessor in interest,
waived its immunity in the Eastern District of Texas litigation.357
Nevertheless, Judge Bryson’s overt condemnation for the
transaction in fact foreshadowed the Federal Circuit’s treatment
of the issue on appeal.358
C. The PTAB Rejects Tribal Immunity
The Tribe did, however, move to terminate the IPR proceeding
on immunity grounds during IPR.359 Unlike the district court
litigation, the PTAB’s adjudicative authority is limited in IPR to
considering the validity of the patent under Sections 102 and 103
of the Patent Act.360 Considering whether the Tribe has immunity
only arises because of the threshold question of whether the Board
has jurisdiction to consider patent validity.361 In this context,
though, the jurisdictional inquiry is more politically loaded than a

356. See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB,
2017 WL 4619790, *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (invalidating the patents on
obviousness and anticipation grounds).
357. See id. at *4 (“[A]ny possible immunity from suit that might be applicable
to avoid litigation brought against the Tribe has no application to this action.”).
358. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The Board denied the Tribe’s motion to terminate on the basis
of sovereign immunity and Allergan’s motion to withdraw from the proceedings.
Allergan and the Tribe appeal, arguing the Board improperly denied these
motions. We affirm.”).
359. See Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on
Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 22, 2017) (moving to
dismiss IPR for lack of personal jurisdiction).
360. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (establishing the scope of IPR); Software
Industry Association Amicus Brief, supra note 131 (“Agency proceedings
involving patent validity do not involve private rights and duties.”).
361. See Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2018 WL 1100950, at *16 (acknowledging that
the Board’s congressional authority is limited to assessing the patentability of the
challenged claims).
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typical patent dispute.362 Indeed, the PTAB itself, when
considering the applicability of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
acknowledged that the issue is more weighty than deciding the
validity of a patent.363
Yet, unhindered by these political considerations, the PTAB
found that tribal immunity does not apply to IPR.364 On February
23, 2018, the Board denied the Tribe’s motion to terminate, thus
continuing its jurisdiction over the Restasis patents.365 The Board
found that Allergan remained the effective patent holder after
assigning the patents-at-issue to the Tribe because Allergan
retained substantial rights via the license agreement.366
Additionally, the PTAB determined that because Allergan remains
the effective patent holder, the IPR proceeding can continue
without joining the Tribe.367
The PTAB’s reasoning is unpersuasive in two respects. First,
the PTAB found that that FMC’s analysis does not extend to tribal
immunity,368 but nevertheless underwent a similar comparative
analysis.369 The Board, instead, states the platitude that tribes
enjoy “the common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed
by sovereign powers[],” but concludes that IPR is not a “suit”
362. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (discussing the PTO Director’s political accountability in
deciding whether to institute IPR).
363. See Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017–01186, 2017
WL 6517563, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (using the board’s authorization to
expand the ordinary three judge panel on the grounds that Eleventh Amendment
immunity poses an issue of “exceptional importance”).
364. See Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2018 WL 1100950, at *11 (“Tribal immunity does
not apply to inter partes review.”).
365. Id.
366. See id. at 20–35 (discussing the substantial rights distributed between
licensor and the licensee to determine the true patent holder, including the right
to sue for infringement; right to make, use, and sell products or services under
the patents; right to sublicense; reversionary rights in patents; right to litigation
or licensing proceeds, among others).
367. See id. at 35 (“Because Allergan remains the effective patent owner, we
determine that these proceedings can continue with Allergan’s participation only,
regardless of whether tribal immunity applies to the Tribe.”).
368. See id. at 7–8 (concluding that the Board is not mandated to extend FMC
to tribal immunity).
369. Id. at 16.
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within the meaning of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.370
The Board thereafter employs the very same comparative analysis
as in Covidien, comparing IPR to the traditional litigation, but
reaches a wholly different conclusion—ultimately finding that
tribal immunity does not apply to IPR.371
This conflicting outcome is perplexing. Whether IPR is similar
to civil litigation should not turn on which sovereign is asserting
immunity. Either IPR is sufficiently similar to civil litigation to
require application of the immunity doctrine or it is insufficiently
similar. To rationalize this flagrant contradiction, the panel rightly
notes that tribal and state immunity are not identical.372 Indeed,
Part III.A and C of this Note explore those differences. Yet, none
explain why one sovereign patent owner should fare differently in
an administrative patent reexamination hearing than another.
Additionally, the panel states that the Supreme Court and
Congress are silent as to tribal sovereign immunity in IPR.373 But
neither the Court nor Congress has spoken to the applicability of
state immunity in IPR, yet the PTAB nevertheless found Eleventh
Amendment immunity applicable.374
Second, the PTAB’s decision effectively abrogates tribal
immunity via an interpretation of congressional silence. The Court
ordinarily refuses to read de facto abrogation into a generally
applicable statute.375 Such an interpretation is at odds with the
370. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 2018 WL 1100950,
at *1 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
371. See id. at 16–18 (comparing IPR and other “suits,” finding that the
Board’s scope is limited to considering issues of patentability regardless of the
patent holder).
372. See id. at 9 (“[T]he immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not
co-extensive with that of the States.” (quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998))).
373. See id. at 8 (“The Tribe and its supporting amici, however, have not
pointed to any federal court or Board precedent suggesting that FMC’s holding
with respect to state sovereign immunity can or should be extended to an
assertion of tribal immunity in similar federal administrative proceedings.”).
374. But see Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying the FMC standard to patent interference proceedings
at the PTAB).
375. See Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976) (“This omission has
significance in the application of the canons of construction applicable to statutes
affecting Indian immunities, as some mention would normally be expected if such
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widely accepted rule of construction that congressional abrogation
must be explicit.376 It is true that generally applicable laws
ordinarily apply to Native American tribes, but this is not the same
thing as congressional waiver, or abrogation.377 That is, Congress
can pass a generally applicable law that applies to Indian tribes
without authorizing private suits against tribes to enforce the
statute.378 In fact, federal courts have considered this dynamic in
the context of the Patent Act—concluding that no reference to
tribes within the Patent Act warrants tribal immunity during
patent infringement suits.379
D. The Federal Circuit Applies FMC to IPR
In July, 2018, the Federal Circuit largely upheld the PTAB’s
denial of the Tribe’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign
immunity grounds. The key difference, though, is that the Panel
admitted, unlike the PTAB, that “[a]lthough the precise contours
of tribal sovereign immunity differ from those of state sovereign
immunity, the FMC analysis is instructive.”380 Nevertheless it

a sweeping change in the status of tribal government and reservation Indians had
been contemplated by Congress.”); Smith, supra note 181, at 21 (“Absolute
[statutory] silence, of course, deposes of the issue altogether.”).
376. See supra Part III.A (discussing congressional abrogation of tribal
immunity).
377. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116
(1960) (“[I]t is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property
interests.”).
378. See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir.
2000) (“[T]he fact that a statute applies to Indian tribes does not mean that
Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it.”).
379. See Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia Games, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-0608,
2005 WL 2098056, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (“Plaintiff points to no authority
that Congress has expressly waived tribal immunity with respect to the
enforcement of patents.”); Specialty House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe, No.
10-CV-371-GKF-TLW, 2011 WL 308903, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011) (“[T]his
court concludes that the Quapaw Tribe is immune from private suits under
federal patent law.”).
380. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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concluded that IPR is sufficiently distinct from civil litigation that
tribal immunity does not apply.381
The Federal Circuit also had the benefit of two influential
Supreme Court decisions decided after the PTAB’s Saint Regis
Mohawk decision that shed more, albeit conflicting, light on the
degree to which IPR is similar to civil litigation.382 Oil States,
mentioned supra, reinforced that it is within the government’s
authority to reconsider its own prior issuance of a public right.383
Within the framework of FMC, the Federal Circuit found this
suggests IPR is not a dispute between two private parties, but
principally one between the government and the patent holder.384
On the same day as Oil States, the Court held in SAS Institute,
Inc. v. Iancu (“SAS”)385 that the Director does not have the
discretion to hear some of a petitioner’s claims and dismiss others,
but must issue a written decision on all claims.386 SAS had the
effect of significantly limiting the PTO Director’s authority.387
Therefore, “it’s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define
the contours of the proceeding.”388 This has major implications for
the analysis in Saint Regis Mohawk because it suggests that the
381. See id. at *2 (“IPR is neither clearly a judicial proceeding instituted by a
private party nor clearly an enforcement action brought by the federal
government.”).
382. See id. (discussing Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) and SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct.
1348 (2018)).
383. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (“[T]he public-rights doctrine applies to matters ‘arising
between the government and others, which from their nature do not require
judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.’”).
384. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d, at 1327 (“[T]he [Oil States]
Court emphasized the government’s central role in IPR and the role of the USPTO
in protecting the public interest.”).
385. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
386.See id. at 1354 (“So when § 318(a) says the Board’s final written decision
‘shall’ resolve the patentability of ‘any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,’
it means the Board must address every claim the petitioner has challenged.”).
387. See Oral Argument at 21:33, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm.
Inc., No. 2018-1638, 2018 WL 3484448 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2018),
https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/36881/saint-regis-mohawk-tribe-v-mylanpharmaceuticals-inc/ (probing the appellee’s attorney whether filing a complaint
in federal court and filing a petition at the PTO differs after SAS).
388. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).
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PTAB, much like an Article III judge must adjudicate a plaintiff’s
complaint, must issue a written decision on all the petitioner’s
claims.389 Yet the Federal Circuit found that although the
Director’s discretion is curtailed under SAS, he still makes the
pivotal decision of whether to institute review.390 Therefore, in
theory, the Director has the capability to weigh the political
considerations of whether to initiate IPR review of a patent held
by a sovereign.391 Practically speaking, whether this balancing
actually occurs—and whether the same balancing considerations
are engaged when considering state versus tribal immunity—is
unknown.
Like the Panel’s overly formalistic consideration of SAS, it also
misses the spirit of FMC by focusing too narrowly on minor
procedural differences between IPR and civil litigation.392 In FMC,
the Court used the similarity of procedures as helpful
benchmarks,393 but also took note of the broader similarities that
were pertinent to the central concern—“whether they are the type
of proceedings from which the Framers would have thought the
States possessed immunity when they agreed to enter the
Union.”394 Borrowing from a case where the Court decided that
Administrative Law Judges possess absolute immunity like Article
III judges for their judicial decisions, the Court observed:
[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency adjudication
contain many of the same safeguards as are available in the
judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature. They
are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political
influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or
documentary evidence, and the transcript of testimony and
389. Id.
390. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371 (“The decision whether to institute inter
partes review is committed to the Director’s discretion.”).
391. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The Director bears the political responsibility of determining
which cases should proceed.”).
392. See id. at 1328 (“[T]he USPTO procedures in IPR do not mirror the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
393. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 758 (2002)
(discussing the similarities between ALJs and district court judges, the Federal
Rules of Procedures and the FMC’s procedures, and discovery practices).
394. Id. at 757–60.
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exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive
record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings
and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented on the record.395

Undoubtedly, IPR features much of these same broader
characteristics. But the Panel’s analysis obscures the practical
reality that IPR has the spirit of an adversarial proceeding. As a
result, it has “many of the usual trappings of litigation,”396 without
identical procedures.
Another shortcoming of the Federal Circuit’s decision is the
absence of any mention of Vas-Cath,397 which was itself a Federal
Circuit decision that influenced the PTAB’s findings for state
immunity.398 Each proceeding at the PTO can be understood on a
continuum between inquisitorial and adversarial. On the far left
side, proceedings like ex parte reexamination are plainly
inquisitorial and therefore do not implicate sovereign immunity.399
On the right side of the continuum are those proceedings that are
unmistakably adversarial.400 But many proceedings fall
somewhere in the middle, forcing courts to engage in the practice

395. See id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
396. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353–54 (2018).
397. 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
398. See, e.g., Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., No.
IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *4–5 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (discussing
Vas-Cath before comparing civil litigation and IPR).
399. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (“Any person at any time may file a request
for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior
art . . . .”); Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The Tribe acknowledged that sovereign immunity would not
apply in ex parte or inter partes reexamination proceedings because of their
inquisitorial nature.”).
400. There is no administrative patent proceeding in which immunity
definitely applies. However, clearly the most adversarial patent proceeding in
which sovereign immunity applies would be district court litigation. See Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635
(1999) (finding unconstitutional a statute abrogating state immunity in patent
disputes and thus allowing states to assert immunity in patent litigation); Tegic
Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Texas Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1344–45
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that plaintiff was barred from bringing a declaratory
action against a state patent holder).
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of line-drawing and resulting in a handful of contradicting
opinions.401
Here, Saint Regis Mohawk and Vas-Cath further compound
these inconsistencies. But rather than clarify the apparent conflict,
the Federal Circuit ignored this precedent entirely. Because
Vas-Cath concerned an interference proceeding rather than IPR,
and because the case dealt directly with the issue of waiver and
not applicability of sovereign immunity, it does not explicitly
control the outcome of Saint Regis Mohawk.402 Still, the Vas-Cath
holding inescapably implied that sovereign immunity applies to
interference proceedings.403 It seems that interference proceedings
fall to the right of IPR on the inquisitorial–adversarial continuum
(meaning interference and derivation proceedings are more
adversarial than IPR) because the petitioner has a stake in the
dispute, whereas in IPR the petitioner may lack constitutional
standing.404 But rather than address and distinguish Vas-Cath
head on, the Federal Circuit failed to cite or discuss it at all.
Perhaps wary of the discrepancy between the PTAB’s state
immunity decisions and the Saint Regis Mohawk holding, the
Federal Circuit interestingly concluded, “[w]hile we recognize
there are many parallels, we leave for another day the question of
whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity

401. Compare Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (emphasizing that it is within the USPTO’s authority
to reexamine and cancel patent rights and therefore that IPR does not violate
Article III), and Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44,
(2016) (distinguishing IPR from civil litigation to find that the PTO was
reasonable for imposing a different standard of proof in IPR than in litigation),
with Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1352 (explaining that IPR “mimics” civil litigation).
402. See supra Part IV (discussing Vas-Cath and its effect on the
intersection of sovereign immunity and IPR).
403. See, e.g., Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No.
IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *2–3 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017) (relying on
Vas-Cath’s finding that sovereign’s are immune from interference proceedings to
conclude that states are likewise immune from IPR).
404. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)(1) (2012) (“An applicant for patent may file
a petition with respect to an invention to institute a derivation proceeding in the
Office.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 311 (“[A] person who is not the owner of a
patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of
the patent.”).
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differently.”405 Because the Federal Circuit evaluated tribal
immunity under the FMC standard, which was originally created
to determine applicability of state immunity in administrative
proceedings, it seems nearly impossible that the court will come to
a different conclusion if and when it considers the issue of state
immunity in IPR.406 But the difficulty and capaciousness of
determining whether IPR is akin to civil litigation, together with
the federalism implications inherent in the federal government’s
affecting a state patent holder,407 suggests that continuing
application state but not tribal immunity in IPR is not a foregone
conclusion.
Illustrating this point, Senator McCaskill introduced a bill
directly in response to the announcement of the Allergan–Saint
Regis deal that would abrogate only tribal immunity in IPR.408
Additionally, the issue of whether a state university waives its
Eleventh Amendment immunity in IPR by filing an infringement
suit in federal court is unfolding at the time of publication.409 As
such, the potential for disparate and conflicting legal standards
regarding states and tribes, and their corresponding immunity
405. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1329.
406. See State Amicus Brief Support En Banc Rehearing, supra note 64, at
1– 2 (filing an amicus brief in support of an en banc rehearing because of the
likelihood that the Federal Circuit’s Saint Regis Mohawk decision will affect state
immunity in IPR).
407. Note that under FMC, the federal government can institute a proceeding
against a state. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
764 (2002) (“[T]he States have consented to actions brought by the Federal
Government.”). Still, the Court’s recent state immunity jurisprudence is
increasingly sensitive to the federal government’s encroachment on state
authority. See Christopher G. Paulraj, Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority: Extending the States’ Sovereign Immunity to
Administrative Adjudications, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 679, 680 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has extended the principles of federalism to unprecedented new heights,
resulting in a drastic curtailment of the federal government’s ability to regulate
the states and their instrumentalities.”).
408. See S. 1948, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (“Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, an Indian tribe may not assert sovereign immunity as a defense
in a review that is conducted under chapter 31 of title 35, United States Code.”).
409. See Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017
WL 6517563, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (“[W]e determine . . . Patent Owner
has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing an action in federal court
alleging infringement of the patent being challenged in this proceeding.”).
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within patent administrative adjudication, is growing ever
complex. To ensure uniformity both in law and policy, Congress is
the organ of government best equipped to address the applicability
of sovereign immunity in administrative patent review.
Abrogating immunity should not be taken lightly, as
evidenced by Congress’s continued reluctance to do so.410 This is
especially true in the area of Indian law. The Supreme Court
repeatedly emphasizes that “federal encroachment upon Indian
tribes’ natural rights is a serious undertaking.”411 The trepidation
with which the Court approaches sovereign immunity reflects an
understanding that Congress’s decision not to abrogate is
purposeful, not accidental.412
Furthermore, tribal immunity is one narrow legal principle
embedded within a far-reaching socio-political landscape—one
which oftentimes robs tribes of other opportunities for economic
development.413 The PTAB and the Federal Circuit, in considering
just the isolated issue of tribal immunity in IPR, unavoidably
misses the broader political ramifications of its decision.
The proceeding discussion examines the broader implications
of the PTAB and Federal Circuit’s decisions. In doing so, this Note
argues that Congress should not legislate differently with respect
to tribes and states in IPR proceedings—whether it upholds
immunity for both governmental units or forecloses each from
asserting immunity in IPR. This discussion offers a potential
avenue for congressional abrogation of both tribes and states
despite Congress’ constitutional constraint to affect state
immunity.
410. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (“It has
restricted tribal immunity from suit in limited circumstances.”); MAUREEN M.
MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-851 A, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: BACKGROUND
AND CURRENT ISSUES 26–27 (1997) [hereinafter Murphy Congressional Research]
(questioning a proposal to abrogate tribal immunity upon receipt of federal
funding because of the statute’s overly broad language).
411. Fla. Paraplegic, Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126,
1130 (11th Cir. 1999).
412. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (finding that
congressional silence is not a passive delegation to the courts, but a deliberate
choice not to afford a remedy that would abrogate tribal immunity).
413. See Allergan’s E.D. Texas Complaint, supra note 36, at 9–10 (discussing
tribal initiatives to generate income to support its infrastructure).
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V. Sovereign Patent Holders in IPR
That the PTAB has held that state universities, but not tribes,
are immune from inter partes review is illogical from both a legal
and policy standpoint. The PTAB’s finding, affirmed by the Federal
Circuit, that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to IPR
creates a disparity between the two sovereigns unsupported by any
meaningful justification.414 What is more, this differential
treatment does little to abate the legitimate concern that sovereign
immunity in IPR manipulates the U.S. patent regime because
state universities continue to enjoy immunity from IPR review.
The Board misconstrued any differences between tribal and
state immunity in finding that tribal immunity is inapplicable to
IPR.415 Furthermore, although not so flagrantly treating tribes and
states differently, the Federal Circuit did little to clarify earlier
decisions upholding Eleventh Amendment immunity patent
administrative proceedings and declining to extend tribal
immunity to IPR.416 As described in Parts II and III, tribal and
state sovereign immunity are indeed different in some
respects—the most important difference being Congress’s ability
(and inability) to affect the scope of their sovereignty. But those
differences are not significant, let alone dispositive, in the context
of patent reconsideration.
Amici supporting the petitioner generic drug companies
lumped the two sovereigns together in their argument that “a
State or a Tribe may, on the one hand, take full advantage of the
remedies and benefits afforded the patent owner, but yet use
sovereign immunity to escape IPR.”417 Additionally, a number of
states have filed an amicus brief supporting the Tribe’s petition for
414. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (“[W]e
determine the Tribe has not established that the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity should be applied to these proceedings.”).
415. See Brief of Appellants at 23, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1638) (“But the Board never
explained the differences or why they dictated opposite results.”).
416. See supra Part IV.C (pointing to the Vas-Cath gap in the Federal
Circuit’s Saint Regis Mohawk analysis)
417. Software Industry Association Amicus Brief, supra note 131, at 3.
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en banc reconsideration, arguing that the Panel misapplied FMC
and the decision gravely harms states and tribes.418 This
demonstrates that opponents of sovereign immunity in IPR place
no significance on whether the entity is a state or a tribe—both are
equally damaging to the patent system. Similarly, states are wary
that exclusion of tribal sovereign immunity presupposes the same
fate for state sovereign immunity in IPR. As such, states and tribes
are fungible, that is, interchangeable in their participation in IPR
as patent holders.419
Accepting that patent owners are fungible, there is no policy
reason for state and tribal patent owners to possess different legal
rights during administrative patent reexamination hearings.
Either shielding patent rights intolerably harms the patent system
or immunity is necessary to protecting sovereign dignity.
To correct the currently disparate treatment of each sovereign
within IPR, Congress should speak to this issue unequivocally and
uniformly. Accepting that Congress has the authority to abrogate
tribal immunity, the proceeding analysis explores one avenue
which Congress may utilize to abrogate state immunity. It is
therefore arguable that Congress has the authority to abrogate
both state and tribal immunity in IPR to prevent evasion of the
PTO’s administrative reexamination system.420
A. Congressional Abrogation of Tribal and State Immunity in
Inter Partes Review
To take this position, this Note argues that state sovereign
immunity may not apply in IPR at all because the PTAB’s
418. See State Amicus Brief Support En Banc Rehearing, supra note 406, at
2 (“Sovereign immunity protects States’ sovereign dignity and the value of
patents held by States and their public universities.”).
419. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Appellants Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe and Allergan, Inc., Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896
F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-01638) (“Although the panel stated that its
decision was limited to the assertion of tribal immunity, the panel’s holding turns
entirely on the inherent attributes of the IPR proceeding itself. Those attributes
are the same for all IPRs . . . .” (citations omitted)).
420. See S. 1948, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (abrogating only tribal
sovereign immunity in IPR).
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jurisdiction is a species of in rem jurisdiction. This analysis is
similar to the FMC standard: that application of the immunity
presumption turns on “whether [it is] the type of proceedings from
which the Framers would have thought the States possessed
immunity when they agreed to enter the Union.”421 But instead of
observing the similarities and differences between IPR and civil
litigation, comparing the similarities between a bankruptcy court’s
in rem jurisdiction over debts and the PTAB’s jurisdiction over
patents demonstrates a lack of the state immunity presumption.
The following discussion considers the similarities and
differences between in rem jurisdiction and the PTAB’s
jurisdiction, ultimately finding that there is a legitimate argument
that PTAB jurisdiction inheres no state immunity presumption.422
The similarities between a bankruptcy proceeding and IPR
flow from the fact that both are types of in rem jurisdiction.423 Like
a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over an individual’s assets, the
USPTO has jurisdiction over patent reexamination claims because
of the patent, irrespective of the identity of the patent holder.424
Put differently, the PTAB has jurisdiction over “the res, not on the
persona.”425 Additionally, the Director does not require the patent
owner’s continued participation to have jurisdiction over the

421. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 756 (2002).
422. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 452 (2004)
(“We noted that we have applied a presumption since Hans v. Louisiana, ‘that the
Constitution was not intended to rais[e] up any proceedings against the States
that were anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
423. See Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 2017 WL 6517563, No.
IPR2017-01186 at *6 (Dec. 19, 2017) (“At its core, inter partes review is a
circumscribed in rem proceeding, in which the Patent Office exercises jurisdiction
over the patent challenged, rather than the parties named.”).
424. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (explaining that because the USPTO has authority to grant
patents, it also has the authority to reconsider them).
425. Hood, 541 U.S. at 450; Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc.,
896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[IPR] does not involve exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the patent holder . . . .”).
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patent,426 much like a bankruptcy court need not join every
creditor to discharge the debtor’s liabilities.427
Both the PTAB and the Federal Circuit support this
argument. In the PTAB’s decision denying the Tribe’s motion to
terminate, it stated that “Congress has enacted a generally
applicable statute providing that any patent (regardless of
ownership) is subject to the U.S. patent regime.”428 Similarly,
reinforcing the majority holding that tribal immunity is
inapplicable in IPR because the USPTO’s reexamination is
sufficiently dissimilar to civil litigation, Judge Dyk noted in his
concurrence that “the Supreme Court has held that ‘adversarial
proceedings’ that do not involve the exercise of personal
jurisdiction do not necessarily raise sovereign immunity
concerns.”429
The differences between PTAB jurisdiction and in rem
jurisdiction, however, highlight the weaknesses in this
comparison. Thus, there is a significant likelihood that if Congress
were to statutorily eliminate state immunity in IPR, the Supreme
Court would find the abrogation unconstitutional. The most
notable difference between a bankruptcy discharge and a patent
invalidation is that a bankruptcy discharge cancels the debtor’s
liability against the entire world,430 whereas a patent invalidation
does the opposite—the invalidation renders the invention
available to the entire world by entering the invention into the
public domain.431 Second, the very name of the proceeding, inter
426. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 317(a), 318(a) (2012) (“If no petitioner remains in the
inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final
written decision . . . .” (emphasis added)).
427. See Hood, 541 U.S. at 447 (describing bankruptcy procedures which
allows the bankruptcy court to discharge the debtor’s liability despite an absence
of creditor claimants); In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The state,
of course, well may choose not to appear in federal court.”).
428. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127,
2018 WL 1100950, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
429. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d, at 1333 (Dyk, J., concurring).
430. See MOORE, ET AL., supra note 261, § 6.21 (describing the nature of in rem
jurisdiction generally).
431. See Covidien LP v. Univ. Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274,
2017 WL 4015009, at *6 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (“[T]he term inter partes means
between the parties, which in itself captures the notion that the proceeding is
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partes, indicates that the proceeding is adversarial in nature.432
The Hood Court examined this point only as to the specific
proceeding at issue—an “adversary proceeding,” and found that
despite its name and notice of process on the state, the Bankruptcy
proceeding was not in fact a “suit” within the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment.433 Third, and least compelling, the PTAB’s
authority touches the patent holder herself in its estoppel
provisions.434 The rules governing estoppel, however, only extend
the PTAB’s jurisdiction to the patent owner in so far as she is
estopped from acting inconsistently with an adverse board decision
relative to patents that are substantially similar.435
Ultimately, this argument faces a number of obstacles. In
general, the Court’s protection of state immunity based in
federalism suggests congressional abrogation of state immunity
would be unsuccessful.436 Additionally, the Court’s decision in
Florida Prepaid is more on point than Hood.437 Although the
procedural touchstones of an in rem proceeding are present in IPR,
IPR is clearly substantively similar to patent litigation. Because
these difficulties are specific to state immunity, any attempt to
abrogate both state and tribal immunity would likely lead to the
same discrepant treatment that exists under the current law.
directed to both parties over whom the Board exercises jurisdiction.”).
432. See id. at *8, (“Patent Owner argues that, under the enacted rules, inter
partes review is similar to civil litigation . . . because inter partes reviews are
adversarial ‘contested cases between a patent owner and a petitioner . . . .’”).
433. See Tenn. Studen Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 452 (2004) (“In
this case, however, there is no need to engage in a comparative analysis to
determine whether the adjudication would be an affront to States’ sovereignty.
As noted above, we have long held that the bankruptcy courts’ exercise of in rem
jurisdiction is not such an offense.”).
434. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3) (2018) (“A patent applicant or owner is
precluded from taking action inconsistent with the adverse judgment, including
obtaining in any patent.” (emphasis added)).
435. See id. § 42.73(d)(3)(i) (extending a PTAB invalidation only over patents
that “[a] claim that is not patentably distinct”).
436. See supra Part III.C (discussing Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid,
making the point that Congress has been unsuccessful at abrogating state
immunity).
437. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999) (finding that the Patent Clause does not give Congress
authority to abrogate state immunity).
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Congress can also elect not to limit sovereign immunity in IPR.
The obvious difficulty in considering whether to abrogate any
sovereigns’ immunity is the potential unfairness to plaintiffs, or
here, petitioners seeking patent review.438 In the context of patent
review, this concern is exasperated by the sense that sovereigns
are undermining the patent system as a whole and, in effect,
weakening the quality of patents. In the case of the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe, this seems especially unfair because, unlike state
universities that are involved in developing the underlying
technology, here the Tribe’s only contribution to the transaction is
their sovereign status and concomitant immunity.439
This is because the FMC framework accounts for only the
primary justification for sovereign immunity—dignitary
interests—with little if no attention given to the secondary
justification, financial interests.440 Shifting focus to protecting a
sovereign’s financial interest, it becomes less objectionable to allow
tribes to strategically “rent” their immunity in exchange for
lucrative patent rights.
Keeping in mind the often-forgotten justification for sovereign
immunity to protect a sovereign’s economic interests, with special
attention given to tribes’ desperate need for economic
diversification, invocation of tribal immunity in IPR is more
defensible. States continue to enjoy sovereign immunity after
Florida Prepaid in patent disputes, and now also within IPR at the
PTO.441 Why unequally disadvantage tribes, especially where their
opportunities for economic diversification are so limited?
438. See Lundgren, 187 Wash. 2d at 877 (Gonzales, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority’s analysis as misplaced because of a “desire to reach
the merits of the action so that both parties can have their day in court” instead
of the threshold question of whether a sovereign is an indispensable party).
439. See Crouch, supra note 47 (“Of course, a major difference with the
university situation is that the university patents are the outcome of original
university research.”).
440. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”).
441. See Covidien LP v. Univ. Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016–01274,
2017 WL 4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (dismissing petitions for review
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Despite Congress’s push towards tribal economic
independence, tribes continue to struggle generating sufficient
economic support for such basic infrastructural needs like paved
roads, housing, sewage systems, and steady electricity.442 This
chronic economic underdevelopment is due in part, although
certainly not entirely,443 to certain tax policies: the unavailability
of tax exempt bonds for tribes444 and states’ authority to collect
taxes from on-reservation mineral leases.445 Generally,
governmental entities finance projects in one of three ways: (1) tax
revenue, (2) debt instruments, such as bank loans or bond
of University of Florida’s patent on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds).
442. See Clarkson, supra note 165, at 1012–13 (describing tribal governments’
reliance on federal grants rather than tax free bonds that most state and
municipal governments rely on to improve infrastructure).
443. Because the federal government holds most tribal lands in trust, this
prevents tribes from using that land either as collateral to secure bank loans or
to collect taxes. See Clarkson, supra note 165, at 1016–17 (“Given that the federal
government holds most tribal land in trust, those lands are not available for
property taxes, and thus the tax base of a tribe is usually insufficient for a tribe
to issue general obligation bonds.”); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, COMMERCIAL LENDING IN INDIAN COUNTRY: POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES
IN A GROWING MARKET 7 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/communityaffairs/publications/insights/insights-commercial-lending-indian-country.pdf
[hereinafter COMPTROLLER LENDING MANUAL] (“Tribal trust lands generally may
not be sold, taxed, or encumbered, requiring a different process to secure and
perfect a bank’s mortgage liens on real property.”). Additionally, there is a
separate but interrelated issue of tribal jurisdiction over criminal trials of
non-Indians leading to widespread abuse and community safety degradation. See
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978), overruled in part
by United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (“We granted certiorari . . . to decide
whether Indian tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. We
decide that they do not.”); Jessica Rizzo, Native American Women Are Rape
Targets Because of a Legislative Loophole, VICE (Dec. 16, 2015, 11:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bnpb73/native-american-women-arerape-targets-because-of-a-legislative-loophole-511 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018)
(“Eighty percent of the reported sexual violence against Native women is
committed by white men, who do so with virtual criminal impunity because, with
very few exceptions, they cannot be tried in tribal courts.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
444. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 7871(c)(1) (2012) (regulating tax-exempt bonds for
states and tribes, but stipulating that tribes only issue tax-exempt bonds to “be
used in the exercise of any essential governmental function”).
445. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989)
(considering whether the “‘multiple burden’ imposed by the state and tribal taxes
is unconstitutional”).
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issuances, and (3) federal grants.446 Two of these three major
sources of funding are impeded as a matter of law for tribal
governments.
Because of additional restrictions on tribal tax-free bonding
that do not apply to states, tribes have far less access to capital
markets than states or other governmental entities.447 Tax-exempt
bonds are established by § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code and
are at the heart of state and municipal financing for any number
of public projects.448 Investors are incentivized to buy bonds at a
lower interest rate to state bond-issuers because the interest on
the bonds are tax-exempt.449 The tax scheme, although technically
benefiting the bond-buyer, operates as a subsidy to state
projects.450 Understandably, then, the Internal Revenue Code
places restrictions on the types of projects such bonds can be used
to finance.451
However, there are restrictions imposed on tribes that are not
likewise imposed on states—effectively preventing tribes from
taking advantage of borrowing through tax-free bonds to the same
extent that states do. The two key limitations on tribal bonding
were instituted by the Tribal Tax Status Act in 1982,452 an update
446. See Peter J. Herne, Tribal Nations, Indian Gaming, and the Rigged
Economy, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 239, 246–47 (2017) (“For many governments when
the need to raise large sums of money arises, many resort to issuing their own
debt instruments rather than securing a loan, or simply raising taxes.”);
Clarkson, supra note 165, at 1014 (listing “tax revenues, borrowing, and federal
grants” as the three major sources of financing for state and local governments).
447. See Clarkson, supra note 165, at 1017 (“The narrow interpretation of this
language by the IRS has had a stifling effect on tribes’ tax-free bonding
authority.”).
448. See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“[G]ross income does not include interest
on any State or local bond.”); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 531 (1988)
(“Long-term debt obligations are an essential source of funding for state and local
governments.”); Clarkson, supra note 165, at 1054–59 (detailing typical public
projects constituting “governmental functions” that states finance through
tax-exempt bonding, including hotels, parking garages, and golf courses).
449. See Clarkson, supra note 165, at 1032–34 (explaining the IRS’ tax-free
bonds available to states to incentivize investment in governmental projects).
450. Id.
451. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 103(b)(1), 141 (excepting private activity bonds from tax
exemption and defining private activity bonds based on comprehensive criteria to
ensure tax-exempt bonds are not used for private business ventures).
452. S. 1298, 97th Cong. (1982).
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to the Internal Revenue Code ironically meant to equalize tribes’
tax treatment with states.453 First, tribes’ ability to issue bonds per
§ 103 is permitted “only if such obligation is part of an issue
substantially all of the proceeds of which are to be used in the
exercise of any essential governmental function.”454 Second,
because that criteria was ambiguous and routinely litigated, a
provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987455 was
meant to clarify the governmental function requirement.456 The
provision made the requirement even narrower, specifying that the
scope of tribal bond authority be limited to projects that are
“customarily performed by State and local governments with
general taxing powers.”457
Although these provisions seem facially reasonable and in
keeping with the purpose of tax-free bonding schemes, the two
additional restrictions have had the effect of eliminating
altogether tax-exempt bonds as a financing option for tribes.458
Furthermore, they mark a significant difference between the
federal government’s treatment of states and tribes despite the
legislative intent to achieve equal tax treatment.459 The
453. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to
Self-Sufficiency for Indian Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status
Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 339 (1985) (“[T]he Tribal Tax Status Act is
intended to ‘strengthen tribal governments significantly by providing additional
sources of financing and by eliminating the unfair burden of taxes Indian tribal
governments must now pay.’”).
454. Id.
455. Pub. L. No. 100-203, §10632(a), 101 Stat. 1330-1, 1330-455 (1987)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §7871(e) (2012)).
456. See Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax
Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 361 (1994) (“Representative Gibbons
sponsored a measure [in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act] to tighten the
tribal bond measures by limiting essential governmental functions to those
customarily financed with exempt bonds by state and local governments.”).
457. See 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘essential
governmental function’ shall not include any function which is not customarily
performed by State and local governments with general taxing powers.”).
458. See Aprill, supra note 456, at 363 (“Reported tribal bond offerings came
to a standstill for several years.”); Jenny Small, Financing Native Nations: Access
to Capital Markets, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 463, 466 (2013) (“[The IRS’]
restrictive interpretation has long served as a barrier for native nations
attempting to raise capital through the issuance of bonds.”).
459. See Clarkson, supra note 165 at 1039 (noting that the stated purpose of
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differential treatment is rooted, like in the instant issue of
immunity in IPR, in sovereignty. That is, exempting states from
the federal taxation scheme stems directly from notions of state
sovereignty implicit in the constitutional structure.460 As
previously discussed, tribes have no similar constitutional
protection.461
Perhaps the most traditional source of income for
governmental entities is tax revenue.462 Here, too, tribes face
difficulties unfamiliar to states. In Cotton Petroleum Corporation
v. New Mexico,463 the Supreme Court held that nontribal
organizations that lease land for mining on tribal property can be
taxed not just by the tribal government, but also by the state in
which the tribal land sits—causing entities to be doubly taxed.464
Thus, tribes are faced with the dilemma of foregoing their own tax
revenue to keep mineral lessees doing business on tribal property,
or imposing their own tax, making the double-tax prohibitively
expensive for the lessee.465
In both of these discrete tax areas, tribes are denied the same
economic opportunities as their state and municipal counterparts.
Therefore, tribes rely on commercial enterprises in an attempt to
boost revenue.466 By allowing tribes to develop technology
the introduced legislation was to eliminate the perception of differences between
tribal governments and state or local governments”).
460. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 531 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“In my view, the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism
inherent in the Constitution prohibit Congress from taxing or threatening to tax
the interest paid on state and municipal bonds.”).
461. See supra Part III.A (describing the trustee relationship between the
federal government and Native American tribes).
462. See supra note 446 and accompanying text (describing the traditional
sources of income for governmental bodies).
463. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
464. See id. at 180 (“We thus agree that a purpose of the [Indian Mineral
Leasing Act] is to provide Indian tribes with badly needed revenue, but find no
evidence for the further supposition that Congress intended to remove all barriers
to profit maximization.”).
465. See id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“State taxes would also reduce
the funds available to oil and gas producers to meet the financial obligations
placed upon them by the extensive federal and tribal regulatory schemes.”).
466. See Gary Davis, Tribal Economic Development Aspirations: Analyzing
Senator Warren's Recent Speech To Indian Country, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2018, 9:00
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initiatives like the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribes’, Congress has an
opportunity to equalize technological-driven revenue streams in at
least this one, narrow respect. Indeed, state universities have been
hugely successful in their patent development efforts.467
This would also be in keeping with Congress’s initiative to
support tribal economic independence and self-determination.468
The congressional initiative towards self-determination has
proved successful both politically and economically. Politically,
tribal self-determination receives widespread support from
progressives and conservatives.469 Economically, policies rooted in
self-determination have yielded empirically-proven developments
in infrastructure, including availability of schools, health clinics,
and water supply.470
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2018/03/16/tribaleconomic-development-aspirations-analyzing-senator-warrens-recent-speech-toindian-country/#bf1fd8a355a2 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Unlike other
governments, which can levy taxes (or collect sales taxes) to fund these critical
initiatives, tribes are forced to rely largely on the creation of tribal businesses to
generate the revenues that fund tribal government operations.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
467. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Association of Public and Land-Grant
Universities in Support of Appellant, Regents of the University of Minnesota,
Seeking Reversal, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Ericsson Inc. (No. 18-1565) at
3
Collaboration between public universities and industry has led to the
development of countless products that Americans use every
day[.] . . . In addition to these economic and societal impacts,
technology transfer occasionally provides some public universities a
source of revenue that is used to deepen the impact through
reinvestment in further research and educational objectives for the
public good.
468. See COMPTROLLER LENDING MANUAL, supra note 443, at 2 (“There is a
consensus among field experts that Indian Country has experienced significantly
higher economic growth rates since the onset of the self-determination era in the
mid-1970s, compared with preceding decades.”).
469. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, American Indian SelfDetermination: The Political Economy of a Successful Policy 15 (Joint Occasional
Papers
on
Native
Affairs,
Working
Paper
No.
1
2010),
http://nni.arizona.edu/pubs/jopna-wp1_cornell&kalt.pdf
(noting
that
self-determination has bipartisan support from both liberals and conservatives).
470. See id. at 8 (noting that the recent boom in tribal economic development
coincides with low federal funding relative to governmental support of other
impoverished areas).
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In light of the fact that Congress cannot so easily limit state
immunity, abrogating tribal immunity in IPR will not actually
accomplish the benefits of strengthening the quality of patents
through administrative reexamination. Therefore, the Federal
Circuit’s decision finding that tribal immunity does not apply in
IPR should be reversed—leaving such a weighty decision to the
policymaking branch of government that can take into account the
far-reaching landscape of Indian law as it affects tribal
communities.471 As for their part, Congress should not unequally
disadvantage tribal patent holders in IPR—especially considering
other challenges tribal governments face generating revenue.
VI. Conclusion
According to the PTAB and the Federal Circuit, states enjoy
immunity in IPR but tribes do not.472 On the one hand, the PTAB
came to this conclusion by finding that IPR is sufficiently similar
to civil litigation that it offends the dignity of states because it
requires that a state university, as the defendant, be haled into an
adversarial proceeding. On the other hand, the PTAB did not
undergo the same FMC comparison in finding that tribes do not
enjoy immunity from IPR proceedings,473 likely because it would
be patently absurd to find that the extent of the similarity between
IPR and civil litigation hinges on the identity of the sovereign,
rather than the procedures.
471. See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 (2018)
(“Determining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a
grave question; the answer will affect all tribes . . . .”).
472. Compare Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d
1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[W]e conclude that tribal sovereign immunity cannot
be asserted in IPR . . . .”), with Covidien LP v. Univ. Fla. Research Found., Inc.,
No. IPR2016–01274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. 2017) (“[W]e conclude
that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to inter partes review
proceedings.”).
473. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (“The Tribe and
its supporting amici, however, have not pointed to any federal court or Board
precedent suggesting that FMC’'s holding with respect to state sovereign
immunity can or should be extended to an assertion of tribal immunity in similar
federal administrative proceedings.”).
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Rather, the PTAB found narrowly that the non-tribal entity
was the true patent holder, and more broadly that even if a tribe
retained substantial rights in a disputed patent, that tribal
sovereign immunity does not apply to IPR.474 Setting aside the
Board’s narrower holding, the broader holding that FMC does not
extend to tribal sovereignty in administrative proceeding places
undue weight on the difference between state and tribal
sovereignty in the patent context.
True, “the immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not
co-extensive with that of the States.”475 But the PTAB placed too
much emphasis on this axiom. In the context of administrative
patent reexamination, any difference between the two is
insignificant. That is to say, the focus on a patent reexamination
is on the patent, not the patent holder. In this sense, a patent
holder’s participation in the proceeding is limited to defending the
grounds of patentability,476 therefore a state’s interest in defending
its patent is no different from a tribe’s interest in doing the same.
The Federal Circuit, in affirming the PTAB’s holding based on
different reasoning, did little to correct the currently disparate
treatment of tribes and states in IPR.
Perhaps the PTAB misjudged these differences because
Administrative Patent Judges, whose authority is delegated via
the Patent Act and who consider primarily substantive patent
issues, cannot consider the broader policy questions of sovereign
immunity.477 Congress should therefore respond to this growing
issue to address policy and uniformity concerns.
Because states and tribes as patent holders are identical in
IPR, Congress is faced with two options: (1) abrogate both state
474. See id. at *7–8 (finding that tribal immunity does not apply to IPR and
that Allergan retained all substantial rights under the license agreement).
475. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).
476. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (defining the scope of inter partes review).
477. See id. § 6 (“[T]he administrative patent judges shall constitute the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The administrative patent judges shall be persons
of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed by the
Secretary, in consultation with the Director.”); Scholars’ Brief, supra note 59
(“Petitioners’ objections are being raised in the wrong forum. Congress – rather
than the Board, the Article II executive, or even the Article III courts – controls
the availability of tribal sovereign immunity.”).
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and tribal immunity in IPR or (2) abrogate neither state nor tribal
immunity in IPR. First, Congress’s ability to affect state immunity
is more limited than its broad authority to affect tribal immunity.
However, Congress is not altogether foreclosed from passing
legislation that affects state autonomy.478 Congress may have more
leeway to abridge state immunity when the proceeding is in rem in
nature, because the court has jurisdiction over the property, not
the party, and therefore, the central tenet of sovereign
immunity—dignity—is not gravely invaded.479
Second, Congress may unequivocally state that neither state
nor tribal immunity be unavailable in IPR. In light of the
secondary justification for sovereign immunity, protecting a
sovereign’s financial interests, tribes have a compelling policy
reason to retain immunity during IPR proceedings. Tribal
initiatives to expand technology development programs surely
affect tribal economic interests. This is because tribes face unique
obstacles with respect to raising revenue to support their
communities. Economic initiatives that promote tribal
self-determination, by way of economic diversification, should be
encouraged by Congress, not impeded.

478. See Baude, supra 142, at 18 (“Congress’s inability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity is not absolute.”).
479. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 441 (2004)
(“The issuance of process is normally an indignity to a State’s sovereignty,
because its purpose is to establish personal jurisdiction; but the court’s in rem
jurisdiction allows it to adjudicate the debtors’ discharge claim without in
personam jurisdiction over the State.”).

